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IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORGANIC EVOLUTION?*

JAMES O. BUSWELL, III

I

For over one hundred years there has been a continuous controversy between evolutionists and anti-evolutionists over the body of data and theory of the origin, antiquity, and development of life and of man. While the controversy has been continuous, it has by no means been uniform. For a long time each dogmatically defended positions of some truth mixed with considerable error, in violent and fruitless debate, whose brilliance was in many cases mostly oratorical or literary. As the factual and scientific aspects of the evolutionary position increased and became more widely accepted, however, the bases for the anti-evolutionary or creationist[1] opposition remained comparatively constant, with the result that, while the anti-evolutionists continued to actively oppose the evolutionist position, their attacks were less and less frequently reciprocated. Finally the evolutionist's entanglements with anti-evolutionists dwindled to an occasional defense or debate, the last of which of any consequence in this country was the famous Scopes trial of 1925. Interaction still persists in the British Commonwealth, however, chiefly due to the seemingly tireless efforts of the Evolution Protest Movement with active branches in London, Australia, and New Zealand.

Quite another pattern also emerges from a general review of this question. It is quite evident that in the view each has taken, and still takes of the other, whether in opposition or reaction, there is a tremendous degree of ignorance as to progress made in the past hundred years. The creationist exhibits in almost all of his anti-evolutionary literature an antiquated, "moth-ball" variety of "ever onward, ever upward" conception of evolutionism reminiscent of the latter nineteenth century, while the evolutionist on his part tends to identify all creationists with an immutability of species — deluge geology — Ussher chronology type of position, sometimes referred to as "hyperorthodox", or "hyper-traditionalist."[2]

*This article constitutes part of Mr. Buswell's chapter in the forthcoming book, *One Hundred Years After Darwin,* scheduled for publication by Eerdmans in the late spring.

1. For present purposes other "anti-" evolutionary views like neo-Darwinian, or neo-Lamarckian, or other variations within scientific circles are ignored.

2. The term "hyperorthodox" has been recently brought into prominence by Dr. Bernard Ramm (1954: 27-31 et passim). Because of its relationship to the terms "fundamentalist" and "orthodox" and because of rather consistent objection

The complicating factor in all this is that while the anti-evolutionist is wrong in his usual appraisal of evolution today, the creationist position is still widely represented by the hyper-traditionalist point of view, from which has split a Creationist group which seeks to keep itself up-to-date scientifically while adopting a non-evolutionary rather than

to its use, it should be clearly defined and its usage clarified. The term "fundamentalist" is today the most widely known label for the Bible-believing creationist in scientific circles. It is important, however, to understand the crucial distinction between at least two meanings of this widely misused term:

> Fundamentalism originally referred to the belief that there are certain great truths in Christianity, which, if changed, would dissolve Christianity. Each Christian is allowed personal conviction in respect to a great number of doctrines and interpretations but that personal liberty is hedged about by key infallible and eternal doctrines. This is the term in its historic and good sense. The movement included such stalwarts as James Orr, J. Gresham Machen, Benjamin Warfield, W. H. Green and the numerous contributors to the famous *Fundamentals* papers.
>
> In more recent years another movement has given the word an odious connotation. Men with much zeal, enthusiasm and conviction, yet lacking frequently in education or cultural breadth, and many times highly individualistic, took to the stump to defend the faith. Many times they were dogmatic beyond evidence, or were intractable of disposition, or were obnoxiously anti-cultural, anti-scientific and anti-educational. Hence the term came to mean one who was bigoted, an obscurantist, a fideist, a fighter and an anti-intellectual [Ramm 1955: 13].

The creationist position which this paper attempts to advance is to be identified with the first, and not the second meaning of "fundamentalist" as defined above. It is fully recognized, however, that all creationists who do not agree with this position are *not* automatically considered in the second category.

It is abundantly clear from his discussion of the matter (1954) that Ramm is employing the term "hyperorthodox" to refer to this second brand of fundamentalist so as not to perpetuate the "odious connotation" with the term. Ramm's reason for this is that

> we can sin to the right as well as to the left. Patriotism can degenerate into jingoism and enthusiasm into fanaticism and virtue into prudishness. It is possible not only to have slack theological views, but have views far more rigid and dogmatic than Scripture itself. Hyperorthodoxy in trying to be loyal to the Bible has developed an exaggerated sense of what loyalty to the Bible means [1954: 29].

He evidently got the term from J. W. Dawson, who, he points out (1954: 28), referred to "pedantic hyperorthodoxy" in evangelical apologetics in 1877.

Certain objections to my use of the term have been raised, however, chiefly upon the basis of a possible mis-identification of this position with sound, theological orthodoxy. Thus the alternatives "distorted orthodoxy" and "blind orthodoxy" have been suggested. Even more significant, perhaps, is the objection to the form of the term itself. Thus the Rev. John Buswell, my brother, wrote me, "Can anyone be hyperorthodox? Is not orthodoxy an ultimate — in one sphere anyway? In other words, many would regard 'hyper-orthodox' as they would 'hyper-straight' or 'hyper-sterilized.' "

Since these objections, and others, seem to have some value, I have chosen to use instead the term "hyper-traditionalist" suggested by my colleague, Professor Joseph Free. Although a bit more cumbersome, this term carries none of the theological associations invariably attached to "orthodoxy" and "fundamentalism", and seems in addition to refer a bit more precisely to those who being bound by tradition, prefer to retain the peripheral, relative, and changeable interpretations with the fundamental truths, without being able to distinguish the difference.

an anti-evolutionary position. It is this position which the modern evolutionist has tended to overlook, and which constitutes the alternative to organic evolution that I wish to set forth here.

The hyper-traditionalist position, however, is the most often heard, though seldom listened-to, expression of creationism. Thus it is not without reason that G. G. Simpson could dispense with a consideration of creationism in a public lecture in Philadelphia in 1950 with words to the effect that "creationists are found today only in non- or anti-scientific circles."

One of the chief drawbacks to the anti-evolutionists, from Darwin's early critics to the present day, familiar as some of their leaders are with the data, is that their activities and literature have been almost completely wrapped up in arguments over petty fragments of the record, assuming that to attack evolution as a total philosophy one must show the data upon which the assumptions are based to be untrue. Instead of offering a positive, non-evolutionary interpretation of the data themselves, they have been guilty of treating them with scorn and sarcasm for no other reason than that the evolutionist has done something with them first.

What results is that both parties claim to have truth on their side and at the same time charge the other with falsity and ignorance. The creationist attacks the evolutionist's total philosophy from the standpoint of revelation, while the evolutionist answers with scientific data. Since the evolutionist is seldom caught up in an argument over revelation, the creationist is inevitably drawn to argue on the evolutionist's own ground in terms of genetic processes or paleontological remains, where he is generally over his depth. This anti-evolutionary position has been characteristically negative and unscientific in spite of its strong adherence to the scriptural fundamentals of the historic Christian faith.

II

Now to a consideration of the non-evolutionary creationist position. There are three major areas to consider, each with its relevant body of evidences and various interpretations. They are:

a. The origin of life.
b. The origin and age of man.
c. The processes of development since their origin.

The consideration of these areas is not simply a question of whether "evolution" or "creation" is the exclusive explanation. Organic evolution is so inclusive and so complex a system that it must be broken down into its constituent elements. This may be attempted on various levels of abstraction. One of the most obvious and important steps which can

be taken is a separation of the consideration of *origins* from the consideration of *process.* I have the impression that British evolutionists are perhaps oftener involved in considerations of origins than are American evolutionists. The American, at least in anthropological circles, tends to leave questions of the origin of the earth and of life to the astronomers, physicists, and biologists on the one hand, or to the philosophers on the other. William Howells has stated the position thus:

> We are totally bewildered, of course, about the beginnings of life and the reasons for our existence, and these are questions which have been grist to the mills of philosophers and myth-makers alike. But we know, roughly, what happened along the way, and that is the story of human evolution [1944: 3].

Considerations of process, then, make up the major concerns of the evolutionist. Therefore let us postpone the consideration of origins to another context.

I find Simpson's three "modes" or aspects of evolution extremely useful for purposes of analysis, and comparison with the Creationist position. The first of these is speciation or "splitting" which, as Simpson points out, "is almost the only mode accessible for experimental biology, neozoology. and genetics. It embraces almost all the dynamic evolutionary phenomena subject to direct experimental attack." The second mode Simpson calls "phyletic" evolution, which "involves the sustained, directional (but not necessarily rectilinear) shift of the average characters of populations. It is not primarily the splitting up of a population, but the change of the population as a whole." While speciation may be called an explanation for races, species, and sometimes genera, Simpson points out that the phyletic mode "is typically related to middle taxonomic levels, usually genera, subfamilies, and families." He also observes that "nine tenths of the pertinent data of paleontology fall into patterns of the phyletic mode" (1944: 202-203).

Thus, although evolution does not consist of wholly distinct processes, and a fossil series, for example, can exhibit speciation, or splitting, in a phyletic pattern through geological time, nevertheless the well documented data of natural selection on these levels — the genetic and geological processes — may be abstracted from the over-all theory of organic evolution. It is the position of the creationist, at this point, that he can accept all of the facts within these two areas of consideration. Thus the creationist need have no quarrel with the transmutation of species or other taxonomic categories, and may fully accept the genetic explanation for variation. Similarly he may accept the evidence of the "evolution" of the horse, and other such well documented paleontological series, upon the basis of the adaptive dynamic interaction of genetic and environmental change called natural selection.

Turning to more anthropological matters, the creationist accepts the evidence for the age of prehistoric man and his culture. He has no quarrel with an antiquity of hundreds of thousands of years; there is nothing in the Bible to indicate how long ago man was created. The date of 4004 B.C. which has been an item of ridicule by evolutionists and a rallying point for the hyper-traditionalist, now finds itself a cultural survival, firmly ensconced in the notes on page 1 of certain editions of the Bible, but without a valid function in either modern Christian theology or chronology.

Neither has the creationist any quarrel with morphological features of ancient man. The Bible, which is the creationist's basis of belief and life, simply says nothing about what Adam looked like. And, although the creationist, Protestant and Catholic alike, must of necessity hold to the belief (which will be further discussed below) that there was a "first man," it is of no consequence whether he looked like a pithecanthropoid or a Caucasoid. Furthermore, if anthropological opinion swings in favor of calling some prehistoric types by separate specific or generic names, and other types *Homo Sapiens* with modern man, this is of relatively little consequence. For the creationist recognizes the arbitrary and non-qualitative nature of taxonomic categories and is not bound to equate any one of them with the "kind" spoken of in Genesis 1.

Thus the creationist looks on with the same interest, or relief, as any anthropologist, when a classic Neanderthaloid posture is straightened up, or a Piltdown forgery exposed. Here, of course, is a characteristic difference from the hyper-traditionalist reaction. When the Piltdown news hit the press early in 1954 the anti-evolutionist and many religious journals were full of "I told you so's" and another major pillar of evolution had fallen! One creationist on the other hand simply expressed "relief that one of the more perplexing riddles of man's prehistory is finally solved." Presumably the same sort of reactions can be expected once Professor Strauss's re-analysis of the La Chappele bones[3] gains wider circulation.

III

So far we have discussed chiefly those areas of concurrence between the evolutionary and the creationist positions. With the consideration of Simpson's third mode, however, we introduce the area of disagreement between the two. Essentially it boils down to a matter of facts vs. theory, data vs. interpretation, or a matter of attitudes and pre-suppositions.

Despite the factual basis of speciation and phyletic evolution, there are what Simpson refers to as "major discontinuities of the record" existing in the paleontology of the larger taxonomic groups between which there

3. William L. Strauss, Jr., presented before Section H of the 123rd annual meeting of the AAAS in New York, December, 1956.

is no fossil evidence of relationship. The origins of these larger groups are attributed to "a particular set of evolutionary events" that are "changes of adaptive zones such that transitional forms between the old zone and the new cannot, or at any rate do not, persist" (1953: 389). After showing in some detail how this applies to the perissodactyls, or horse group, Simpson concluded in 1944 that

> this regular absence of transitional forms is not confined to mammals, but is an almost universal phenomenon, as has long been noted by paleontologists. It is true of almost all orders of all classes of animals, both vertebrate and invertebrate. A fortiori, it is also true of the classes, themselves, and of the major animal phyla, and it is apparently also true of analogous categories of plants [1944: 107].

Now Simpson's third mode called "quantum" evolution purports to be the explanation for the jumping of these gaps. In his words, quantum evolution is "applied to the relatively rapid shift of a biotic population in disequilibrium, to an equilibrium distinctly unlike an ancestral condition. . . . It is . . . believed to be the dominant and most essential process in the origin of taxonomic units of relatively high rank, such as families, orders, and classes. It is believed to include circumstances that explain the mystery that hovers over the origins of such major groups" (1944: 206).

Simpson candidly admits this as a "controversial and hypothetical" attempt to establish the existence of an "inferred phenomena." He points out that "major incidents of quantum evolution have systematically poor records, for reasons discussed [above]. Nevertheless, we do have many partial records of quantum evolution, even at high levels (e.g., origin of classes), which can be completed by sound and unequivocal inference."[4]

Of course, Simpson doesn't necessarily represent all evolutionists, but his three-fold breakdown is, de facto, applicable to organic evolution in its present-day form. Thus we conclude that it is at this point — quantum evolution — that the creationist and the evolutionist must part company. Again the question, "What is the alternative?" needs explicit definition. In other words, how will "creation" as an alternative to the quantum interpretation still fit the facts? As mentioned above, it becomes a matter of pre-supposition: for the creationist, supernaturalism; for the evolutionist, naturalism. I propose then that since in a percentage of *orders,* major gaps appear between them, perhaps the *order* is as near to being what Genesis 1 means by the term "kind" as any single taxonomic category can

4. 1953: 389. It should be added that Dr. Simpson points out as "the most important point about this mode of evolution and one of the reasons for its separate designation and special study" that "quantum evolution may lead to a new group at any taxonomic level. It is probable that species, either genetic or phyletic, often arise in this way. Certainly genera and all higher categories may do so. The phenomenon naturally becomes clearer and more readily definable when the change in adaptation and structure is relatively large, and such changes commonly eventuate in the development of higher categories. There is no level at which clear-cut quantum evolution is the only mode of origin of new groups, but at high levels some element of quantum evolution is usually involved" (Ibid.).

be. This proposal implies simply that God created the orders, and natural selection took it from there. Of course this cannot be maintained consistently as far as *orders* are concerned, since in some cases classes or even phyla could be applied, and obviously in the case of man, a much lower category, perhaps genus, would apply.[5] In other words, "an honest creationist will ask the paleontologist what he knows of the time of origin of animals, and draw his conclusions from the data" (Mixter 1953: 18).

Thus, if a supernatural presupposition is allowed, the interpretation may still remain consistent with the facts. One of the basic postulates of evolution, for example, is that *similarity implies genetic relationship.* However, with a supernatural agency pre-supposed, it becomes exactly as reasonable to postulate that *similarity implies a common creator.*

The fact that the evolutionary hypothesis as a total explanation for all major transitions is so firmly established in our scientific and educational system is due to at least three important factors. 1. Based upon the experimental knowledge of genetics, the sequential data of paleontology, and the logical consistency of the processes of adaptation and natural selection as presently conceived, this major jumping of gaps, in Simpson's words, "has a probable mechanism and would be expected under given conditions" (1944: 207). 2. The only alternative, creation, or the allowance of a supernaturalistic presupposition in the tradition of science, has been considered as clearly "incredible."[6] 3. The creationists, due to their own peculiar tradition of fending off the advances of science, have failed to formulate this alternative in a scientifically respectable manner.

The primary point of difference, then, between evolutionism and creationism is not a matter of accepting or rejecting facts. There are no data as such that conflict with the Genesis account of creation as interpreted in the context of the author's language and culture. The primary point of difference is on the level of mechanistic vs. supernatural presuppositions. Most evolutionists claim with G. S. Carter, that "man is an animal, and,

5. Mixter arrives at a similar conclusion suggesting that the order is at present a reasonable approximation of "kind". The obvious fact that "kind" cannot be equated consistently with any one taxonomic category is also explained as follows: "Because marsupials are separated by structural gaps unbridged by intermediate forms from other orders of mammals, a creationist may conclude that the first marsupials were specially created. If there are gaps between families or genera within the order of marsupials, he may believe that such families also had separately created beginnings. Whenever a gap is filled then a revision of the idea of what are the special creations should be made" (Mixter 1953: 17).

6. "Evolution itself is accepted by zoologists . . . because no alternative explanation is credible" (Watson 1929: 231). "The only alternative (to evolution) is the doctrine of special creation which may be true but is irrational" (More 1925: 22). ". . . If Darwin's hypothesis be rejected, there is, it must be frankly admitted, no satisfactory alternative to take its place" (Scott 1917: 26). I am indebted to Dr. John R. Howitt, Superintendent, Ontario Hospital, Port Arthur, Ontario, for these three quotations.

however greatly his present state differs from that of the rest of the animal kingdom, we must accept that he arose from sub-human ancestors by a process of evolution" (1953: 327). And, despite their acknowledgment that man is a wholly unique, or culture-bearing animal, most would tend to agree with Simpson that "man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in mind. He was not planned. He is a state of matter, a form of life, a sort of animal, and a species of the Order Primates, akin nearly or remotely to all of life and indeed to all that is material" (1949: 344-45). The creationist claims that man is more than a unique animal, and that he was both planned and created by God.

In summary on these three modes of evolutionary process, the creationist may well hold, with Professor Mixter (1953: 10-11, 23), the following conclusions:

1. Speciation. "Whenever geneticists can show common genes, they are entitled to infer common ancestry."

2. Phyletic evolution. "When animals are traceable to other animals by a closely graded series of transitional forms, [the paleontologist is entitled to infer that] the early forms have given rise to the later ones."

3. Quantum evolution. "When a group of animals is separated from another group by an unbridged gap, then until bridges are found, one may hold that the groups so separated have arisen from independently created kinds."

IV

The questions may well be asked, how does this creationist position differ essentially from the Roman Catholic position, and, does the Catholic position also constitute an alternative to organic evolution?

The crux of the whole matter lies in the question of origins. The creationist, while he fully accepts the facts of genetics and the fossil record, believes that God created life, and man, and that man did not arise from a previously existing organism. This position is frequently, but erroneously, called "theistic evolution," because it allows for some process in God's creative activity instead of necessitating an instantaneous creation. But while genetics and paleontology have played a big part in the expression of organic evolution, they neither alone nor in combination constitute evolution. One might as logically call the creationist a "theistic speciationist" or a believer in "theistic Mendelism" or "theistic stratigraphy" because he grants that God has instituted the hereditary process of genetics and the geological dynamics of prehistory. Or one might call a Bible-believing weather forecaster a "theistic meteorologist" simply because he believes that the laws which God instituted at creation, are believed and relied upon by non-Christian observers as well!

The theistic evolutionist, however, while believing that God is operating the process, also accepts the possibility that man could have arisen for a non-human creature, and that God merely endowed him with a soul, which act constituted the "creation of man," culturally, mentally, and spiritually. This position of theistic evolution is typically, but not exclusively, that of the Roman Catholics, who only specify their opposition to "materialistic" evolution. Dr. J. F. Ewing, in a recent issue of the Catholic *Anthropological Quarterly*, summarizing "The Present Catholic Attitude Towards Evolution" admits that "God may indeed have used a body prepared for the soul as far as possible by evolution. . . ."; that "there is no defined doctrine which opposes a theory of the evolution of Man's body, . . ." and that "the possibility that there were true men before Adam and Eve, men whose line became extinct (in other words, Pre-Adamites), is allowable."

This I find, at present, impossible to accept, on theological as well as on anthropological grounds. Theologically, the fundamental doctrines of the original perfection and subsequent fall of man and his consequent need of redemption; and the role of the Saviour, Jesus Christ, the Son of God in dying on the cross to pay the penalty for the fall, for all who will accept Him, are seriously jeopardized by a first man having descended organically from pre-human parents. Now theistic evolutionists likewise acknowledge the necessity of retaining this doctrine of original sin. It is inextricably tied up with the necessity of having all mankind arise from *one* man. The Catholic statement on this from the Encyclical "Humani Generis" quoted by Ewing, is as follows:

> No Catholic can hold that after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all, or that Adam is merely a symbol for a number of first parents. For it is unintelligible how such an opinion can be squared with what the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Magisterium of the Church teach on original sin, which proceeds from sin actually committed by an individual Adam, and which, passed on to all by way of generation, is in everyone as his own [Cotter 1951: 43].

Thus the theistic evolutionist, if he allows man to have arisen from a non-human form, is obliged to inject some creative action or other upon his physical body in addition to giving him a soul, in order to make that body perfect and not subject to death. To me this is simply an additional and unnecessary complication of hypotheses to which Occam's razor could well apply.[7]

Anthropologically, the theistic evolutionary explanation for the origin of man seems to run counter to what we have become accustomed to expect of the cultural assemblages in association with fossil man. The pre-adamic theory would seem to imply that there were beings morphologically

7. *Essentia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.*

human, but *without culture.* The evidence of human paleontology seems to argue otherwise. Of course we are at once faced with the question, What is morphologically human? I believe that the question of "human or non-human?" cannot be answered categorically upon morphological grounds. The question must be answered on spiritual grounds, which I presume are only indicated by cultural remains.

The problem of the interpretation of the Australopithecines immediately arises. So far no definite indication of any cultural assemblage has been identified.[8] I readily accept the facts of the unique Australopithecine morphology, the marked humanoid conformation of the dentition, the ilium, and other features indicative of an upright posture.[9] Nevertheless, until such time as the chronological problem of Australopithecine's antiquity in relation to true hominids is resolved, and some identifiable cultural assemblage is discovered, I prefer to class them as "non-human" in every sense of the word. I consider Mayr's designation of *Homo transvaalensis* premature, and cannot yet see Robinson's inclusion of Meganthropus in the same genus as Paranthropus without more of the former to go on. But, as I have attempted to point out to my hyper-traditionalist friends, should such a cultural assemblage be identified for the Australopithecines, it will necessitate perhaps a drastic revision of what we are used to considering "human" but nothing more as far as the creationist position is concerned.

By way of summarizing similarities and differences between the Roman Catholic view of evolution and the creationist view: (a) The following points we hold in common (adapted from Ewing 1956: 124):

1. The body of data and the processes of speciation and the paleontological record are accepted without reservation.

2. "We know of Adam and Eve only from revelation, and a belief in an original pair is not in conflict with any real scientific evidence."

8. During the discussion period at the graduate seminar of the Anthropology Department, University of Chicago, February 18, 1957, Dr. F. Clark Howell revealed that according to communications from C. K. Brain in South Africa there had been some 50 Quartzite pebble tools discovered within the past year in the Australopithecus-bearing deposits at Sterkfontein which Mr. Brain was currently investigating.

   Dr. Braidwood then offered the thought-provoking suggestion that as far as he was concerned, the Australopithecines could be a perfectly good tool-making species, yet without necessarily possessing a "cultural assemblage" as normally considered with all of its ramifications. Perhaps the Australopithecines will precipitate a re-definition of "culture" as well as of "human".

9. One anti-evolutionary journal (*The High Way,* XXVI [Oct.-Dec., 1956], 20-39) devoted some twenty pages to criticising my inclusion of the Australopithecinae in an article on fossil man. According to the typical hyper-traditionalist views expressed in this as well as other like periodicals, my position is that of a "compromiser" who is "currying the favor of infidel scientists." I am an "intellectual snob" who is blind to the fact that evolutionists are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to undermine and overthrow the teachings of the Bible!

3. "All men (and hence the first man) are endowed by God with spiritual souls."

4. The first man was constituted a human being "by the direct and immediate action of God, an action that affected both soul and body."

(b) The differences lie in the question of origins which may be summarized as follows:

1. The evolutionary origin of the major taxonomic groups, or of paleontological series between which there is only inferential evidence of connection, sometimes referred to as "quantum" or "macro-" evolution, is *accepted implicitly* by the Catholic theologian, but is rejected by the creationist.

2. The evolutionary origin of man from some pre-human form is *allowed* by the Catholic theologian but is rejected by the creationist.

V

For a long time, evolution has been opposed by a hyper-traditionalist brand of creationism characterized by a negative, anti-evolutionary approach. Consequently evolutionists have erroneously considered creationists as inevitably of this brand, and have tended to overlook the position of a scientifically-minded creationism which has attempted to be *non*-evolutionary in its thinking rather than purely *anti*-evolutionary.[10] This is not surprising however, since these creationists have tended to be less vocal and perhaps a bit more cautious in the expression of their views.

The Roman Catholic theologian has always represented a basically creationist position, but has, with many Protestant scholars, accepted more of evolutionary theory than the facts seem to demand. Thus, with theistic presuppositions demanded, this position is termed by many "theistic evolution."

Thus we are left with three major groups based upon supernaturalistic premises, the hyper-traditionalist, the scientific creationist, and the theistic evolutionist.

In restating our question, Is there an alternative to organic evolution? it would seem that the answer is "yes" regarding origins; "no" regarding processes; and that in comparison with organic evolution, creationism is the alternative, theistic evolution merely a variant.

10. This does not mean that they are any the less aware of the dangerous implications of evolution which run counter to a biblical position. It does mean that they desire to concern themselves with more than mere denunciations of these. They attempt rather to formulate a positive, non-evolutionary interpretation of the facts which is consistent, both scientifically and theologically.

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THE WITHERING OF UNITARIANISM

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This writer has enjoyed the advantages and suffered the disadvantages of living all his life in New England — in fact in Greater Boston. Up until the last decade he was quite accustomed to seeing religious life flourish — outwardly at least — generally only in Roman Catholic parishes. As a life-long Congregationalist he has had intimate and extended experience of the coldness and barrenness of spirit of his own denomination. There were many times when there seemed to be only one consolation: at least we were better off than the Unitarians and Universalists. If there were few faithful communicants at Congregational churches, there were even fewer in the extreme liberal churches. Anyone resident in the area is at no loss to name several nearby Unitarian churches, which, though still possessed of imposing endowments (in many cases transferred from orthodox Congregational forebears) are closed, closing or about to close.[1] The writer has even been active (though unofficially) in the distribution of the assets of one local Unitarian society as it, with poetic justice, disbursed its funds back to the Congregational church from which it originally received them. It cannot be denied that Unitarianism has not reproduced itself, and apart from the general growth in the population of the country has been able to count no significant increase in its constituency.[2] The Universalists have fared

1. "An alarming number of Unitarian congregations, including many receiving American Unitarian Association assistance, had failed during the first third of the century," *The Epic of Unitarianism,* David B. Parke (Boston, 1957), p. 142.

2. In 1895 there were in the United States and Canada 455 Unitarian societies with 519 ministers and an approximate membership of 68,500 (*Ency. Brit.* XXIX, 356, ed. of 1901). By 1957 there were in the United States 373 societies, 333 ordained clergy with charges, and a total membership of 101,549. This is to be compared with the growth of church membership in all religious bodies in the United States in relation to total population as follows: 16% in 1850, 36% in 1900, and 62% in 1956. Even the Congregationalists, who were early threatened with innundation and dispossession by the Unitarians and who were

slightly better but they have met an essentially similar fate testified to by the recent association of the two groups for self-preservation.[3] Thus, one may raise the important question as to the reason for the enfeeblement of a movement which at the outset seemed as if it might eventually sweep all before it.

I. *Unitarian Origin and Development*

Chadwick derived the name Unitarian from the *Uniti* society in Transylvania which lent its support to the cause of mutual toleration between Calvinists, Romans, and Socinians.[4] As the most active participants, the believers in the divine Unity retained the name thereafter. In the history of doctrine one may trace the roots of the modern view back at least as far as to the Ebionites of the early church — a Jewish-Gnostic combination.[5] Interestingly enough most of these early heretics conceded the supernatural birth of Christ, though they taught that he was only a man specially honored of God. They allowed, however, a subsequent, relativistic deification on the basis of his earthly work.[6] Others held similar views (cf. Cerinthus) and went on to deny the resurrection.[7] By the fourth century the Arians had arisen to continue their influence for at least a half century after their condemnation at the Nicene Council. They taught that Christ was brought into being at the beginning of creation and thus was entirely a creature who could not be of one being or substance with the Father.[8] About their only significant accomplishment was a certain missionary success among the Goths, for whom acceptance of Christ was quite a congenial matter: "Christ was to them a hero-god, a demigod, and the later Goths could worship Christ and heathen idols impartially."[9]

much blighted by liberalism themselves, had grown to a total membership of 1,379,394 by 1957. See *Yearbook of American Churches,* Benson Y. Landis (New York, 1957), pp. 41, 110, 286.

3. "Beginning in 1953 the consolidation of Unitarian and Universalist energies in the Council of Liberal Churches has fulfilled a century-long dream of practical cooperation and mutual aid among the liberal Churches of America," Parke, *op. cit.,* p. 146. According to the curator of the historical library of the American Unitarian Association in Boston, the status (February, 1958) of the relationship is one of being linked but not fully merged. It seems that even extreme liberals have difficulty in getting together.
4. *Old and New Unitarian Belief,* p. 20, quoted in Strong, *Systematic Theology* (Philadelphia, 1907), p. 330.
5. See Schaff, *History of the Christian Church,* III, (London, 1869), pp. 618-621, 641-650; Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity,* I (New York, 1937), pp. 348-349, 213-215. The Clementine Homilies (c. 150 A.D.) are expressive of their views.
6. See the discussion (brief) in Hodge, *Outlines of Theology* (Belfast, 1878), pp. 103-104.
7. *Ibid.*
8. For a detailed discussion of Arius and Arianism, see Latourette, *op. cit.,* pp. 213-215, also, *An Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York, 1945).
9. Strong, *op. cit.,* p. 329.

Unitarianism[10] is the ideological child of Arianism but the descent is not direct; it was a group of humanists in Italy in the sixteenth century in whom the emphasis of Arius in resistance to the doctrine of Christ as Very-God is next found. The leaders of this movement were Laelius and Faustus Socinus. Fleeing the inquisition, they found temporary refuge in Switzerland, where they were influenced by the similar view held by Servetus. Finally, they reached Poland where they were tolerated at first. Faustus Socinus understood his position as based completely on the Scripture (infallible) and he claimed the Apostles' Creed. But for him Christ was never more than a miraculously endowed man who effects salvation by setting an example for men to follow.[11] After a period of growth, the sect was banished from Poland and some of its adherents migrated to Transylvania. Here, in an independent development approximately simultaneously with the original rise of Socinianism, Unitarianism had already split off from the Reformed Church. The exiles from Poland promptly joined in fellowship with them. Other Socinians from Poland were received hospitably in Holland among the Mennonites and Arminian Remonstrants.[12] Through Holland their doctrines reached England (together with the influence of Servetus' writings) and there they became the most important single source of later Unitarianism. A significant number of Presbyterian churches soon became (in the absence of the requirement of creedal subscription) *de facto* Unitarian. To these were added Baptist and other liberal communions.[13] It was not until the nineteenth century that the original thrust of the first negative (but Scripture-affirming) Socinian-Unitarianism was transformed into a non-doctrinal philosophical theism by James Martineau.[14]

10. Further details on the following exposition of the development of the Unitarian movement may be found in: Parke, *The Epic of Unitarianism;* Wright, *The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America;* Wilbur, *A History of Unitarianism* (Cambridge, 1946); Edgell, *William Ellery Channing;* and Crompton, *Unitarianism on the Pacific Coast* (Boston, 1957). For a brief over-all survey of the history and practices of Unitarianism, see the paper-back, *A Pocket Guide to Unitarianism;* ed. by H. B. Scholefield (Boston, 1954).
11. See Parke, *op. cit.,* p. 24.
12. In the United States the Arminians were early an important factor in assisting in the development of Unitarianism. See Wright, *The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America* (Boston, 1955), pp. 9-28. Cf. "A Summary of the Unitarian Problem in the Congregational Churches" (unpublished thesis, Gordon Divinity School, 1956), C. A. Lyons.
13. "The summit of the liberal spirit [of the 17th century] was probably the mind of John Milton, whose *Anti-trinitarian Treatise on Christian Doctrine* [*sic*] was completed shortly before the great poet's death in 1674," Parke, *op. cit.,* p. 33.
14. "Priestly, Channing, and J. Martineau are the examples of the successive phases of Modern Unitarianism. Priestly, of the old Socinianism, building itself upon a sensational philosophy; Channing, of an attempt to gain a large development of the spiritual element; Martineau, of the elevation[?] of view induced by the philosophy of Cousin, and the introduction of the idea of historical progress in religious ideas," Ferrar, *Critical History of Free Thought* (London, 1862), quoted in Hodge, *op. cit.,* p. 104.

Under the influence of Anglican and Presbyterian liberals from England, American Unitarianism arose (as early as 1783) to a certain extent independently of the English Unitarian movement.[15] It tended to be more Arian than Socinian at the outset; that is, to teach Christ as "God" (but not in the orthodox or strict sense) rather than simply to reduce him to the status of a mere man, however good.[16] "By the end of the eighteenth century all the Boston ministers but one, and more than half of those in eastern Massachusetts, had thus quietly abandoned the trinitarian position."[17] In his classes at Harvard Divinity School, the contemporary Unitarian theologian J.A.C.F. Auer used to comment facetiously that when the Congregational residents of Beacon Hill became too wealthy and highly positioned to accept the designation of sinners, they became Unitarian.

In any event, Boston was the early center of the movement. William Ellery Channing was its first popular leader. His Baltimore Sermon (1819) on "Unitarian Christianity" set forth an initial statement around which the like-minded could rally. Andrews Norton of Harvard became the theologian of the movement. This consolidation marks the emergence of Unitarianism into its second stage — that of relatively unorganized but highly articulate opposition to Orthodox Congregationalism. The first stage had consisted of the rather amorphous and often silent development of Arian and Socinian views among the Congregational clergy of eastern Massachusetts. This explains how the emergence of an explicit Unitarianism could occur so suddenly: it had been given at a stroke a voice — that of Channing. By 1825, the American Unitarian Association had been organized and more than a third of the old Congregational Churches had become Unitarian.[18] After the initial spurt, growth was, even at the first, slow. In part, this was due to the presence of two diverse emphases in Unitarianism, one of which might be called conservative, the other radical. In the third decade of the nineteenth century, the latter emerged into maturity in Transcendentialism. This came to be looked on by such men as Channing and Norton with horror — similar to the spirit with which the orthodox

15. "Eighteenth-century religious liberalism evolved simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic. Its leaders corresponded voluminously, upholding and enlarging each other's views." Personal contact ensued and by the end of the century Franklin and Jefferson went to Europe and Murray and Priestly came to America; the movement also shifted from "Christ-centered Socinianism to man-centered Unitarianism." See Parke, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Obviously Socinianism can be considered "Christ-centered" only in a very relative sense.

16. In the eighteenth-century England "the challenge to religious authority . . . was explicit and direct." In New England the shift was slow, implicit, and indirect. See Parke, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Wright, *op. cit.*, suggests that a complete account of the origin of the Unitarian movement in the United States "would have to begin with a list of all the published writings of the ministers of the churches of the Standing Order who can be identified as Arminians," p. 292.

17. Wilbur, in Ferm, *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, p. 802.

18. Wilbur, *Ibid.*

looked on Channing and Norton themselves. At this point, Unitarianism passed from the status of a heresy to that of a clearly non-Christian philosophy. That it was considered so by its earlier leaders is reflected in the debate over Emerson's Harvard Divinity School Sermon of 1857. It was seriously questioned by his own associates whether Emerson could be a Christian. As late as the formation of the National Conference in 1865, the same cleavage persisted. In 1870, articles were adopted in which allegiance to the Gospel of Christ was affirmed. As a consequence, the American Unitarian Association dropped from its list of ministers all who did not claim to be Christian. Twelve years later the articles were softened, and shortly after, the radicals were re-instated, all agreeing simply to cooperate "in advancing the kingdom of God."[19] In the years preceding the second World War, Unitarian conservatism retreated so far into the background that much of Unitarianism became simply a kind of "religious humanism.[20] The Unitarian Professor of Christian Theology at Harvard, J.A.C.F. Auer, never tired of admonishing his hearers to the effect that the evidence for the existence of God simply did not rise to the level of probability. Since the Second World War there has been somewhat of a "revival" in Unitarian circles. A belief in God is returning to some Unitarian pulpits and people are returning to the pews. It is the conviction of the writer that this can be only a temporary ebb in the relentless flow of the logic of the Unitarian position to a thorough-going humanism. This will be, in part, the necessary fruit of an entire freedom in belief — Occam's razor will do the rest.

II. *The Tension Between Biblical and Philosophical Theism: an Exposition*

1. *Channing and early Unitarianism.* In his famous Baltimore Sermon, William Ellery Channing enunciated a position which, though startling and even horrendous to the orthodox, was in a very few years to be considered

19. "The turn of the twentieth century found Unitarianism in a contented slumber . . . The liberal movement did not really enter the twentieth century until 1914. The World War shattered the foundations of the nineteenth century society — custom, order, self-reliance — and with them the foundations of the nineteenth-century liberalism. . . . Nevertheless the liberals were hopeful, trusting in good will, education, and science to usher in the Kingdom of God in a reasonable time," Parke, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

20. The development of religious humanism within and without the Unitarian Church ended the "peaceful" period of early twentieth-century Unitarianism. In fact, in the eastern United States "a generation-long 'humanist-theist controversy broke out in earnest," (Parke, *op. cit.* p. 133).

Soon "increasing numbers of Unitarians and Unitarian churches joined the humanist ranks." By 1933, "A Humanist Manifesto" had been drawn up. Its first draft was executed by Prof. Roy Wood Sellars of the University of Michigan. *Ibid.*, p. 138. Sellars was an able, professional philosopher whose philosophy of physical realism was a significant accomplishment. Other signers included Edwin A. Burtt, John Dewey, John Herman Randall, Jr., and Oliver L. Reiser. See Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America* (New York, 1949), pp. 580-581.

tame and even reactionary. Though it was the fruit "of a century-long campaign for freedom, elegance, and liberality," and "the classic formulation of the liberal creed," [21] it was destined to represent what has been called the more narrowly theological phase of the Unitarian movement. In this it is like the doctrines of Arius and Socinus. It built essentially on the Scripture — the claim of the argumentation was that this was true Christianity, true to the Bible. The theological mind was prepared to reinterpret certain Christian doctrines, but not to move off the traditional Christian foundation, the Scripture.

In this classic utterance, ("Unitarian Christianity" in *The Works of William E. Channing, D.D.,* Am. Unitarian Association, 1886, 367.) Channing affirms the "doctrine of revelation." And, he goes on to insist that:

> We regard the Scriptures as the records of God's successive revelation to mankind, and particularly of the last and most perfect revelation of his will by Jesus Christ. Whatever doctrines seem to us to be clearly taught in the Scriptures, we receive without reserve or exception [367].

However, he wants it to be clearly understood that the Scripture can be comprehended only when carefully examined in the light of reason and the laws of language (368-369). Further, certain "verbal contradictions" must be understood as only apparent: "God never contradicts in one part of Scripture what He teaches in another (369). As to the views that Channing would derive from a sober study of this sacred book, the first enumerated is the Unity of God. "There is one God, and one only (371). "Distinctions between being and person which the sagacity of the later ages has discovered were beyond the understanding of the simple and uncultivated people who were set apart to be the depositories of this great truth" (371). What is more, the Trinitarian interpretation of Scripture involves tri-theism. There are postulated three intelligent agents or minds and this can mean nothing else than three beings (371). Conversely, the Scripture consistently represents one God, the Father, and with Jesus we would worship Him (371). Furthermore, "We believe in the unity of Jesus Christ. We believe that Jesus is one mind, one soul, one being, as truly one as we are, and equally distinct from the one God" (373). However, Channing concedes that by implication, the traditionalist doctrine might be acceptable if plainly and directly taught in Scripture (373). And, he agrees with the orthodox that the impenitent and unyielding are left "to the fearful retribution threatened in God's word (377). Unitarians believe, Channing continues, that Christ was sent by the Father "to rescue men from sin and its consequences and to bring them to a state of everlasting purity and happiness" (378). Yet, Christ is to be understood as Savior, "chiefly as he is the light, physician, and

21. Miller, *The Transcendentalists* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 10, 21.

guide of the dark, diseased, and wandering mind" — Christ is our Savior as He influences our character (380). Love of God is the chief virtue; no virtue can be ours if it is infused into us from without. He objects to the idea of the depravity of man (377), and insists that all virtue is founded in man's moral nature or conscience — "in the power of forming his temper and life according to conscience (380). To conceive of God failing thus to empower man is to put God above the "eternal laws of equity and rectitude to which all other beings are subjected (376). Insisting that any other God ought not to be worshipped (377),[22] Channing makes explicit that he has a source of truth apart from the Scripture — his own moral sense. This is actually his last court of appeal. However, love must not be feeling undirected by the understanding: "If religion be the shipwreck of understanding, we cannot keep too far from it" (381). Here Channing is seen particularly concerned to avoid "the messy emotionalism and the dangerous mysticism that liberal Christianity had striven for a century to exorcise."[23] Channing and his followers later have strong cause to judge the Transcendentalists to have fallen overtly into this error.

Thus Channing calls infant Unitarianism to a viewpoint which is apparently in the minds of its proponents more Arian than Socinian.[24] Many of the marks of orthodoxy are there; foremost, the assertion of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures and a professed willingness to accept all that the Scriptures teach; heaven and hell are affirmed with no suggestion of second probation or universal salvation. The cross is a necessary ingredient of our salvation, and he would stand foursquare against a reduction of Christian virtue to a theology of feeling. Yet, beneath the surface can be seen implications, the logic of which must lead directly to the development of the viewpoint of the Transcendentalists. Basically, it was his doctrine of self-salvation that undermined every orthodox view and rational sentiment that he held. If man is fundamentally good and through the influence of the Scriptures (or whatever the factors may be which build adult and responsible virtue) can respond so as to present himself acceptable before God by his own efforts, then it follows that the clear teaching of Scripture is not followed. If the Trinity is not obviously taught in Scripture, salvation by grace through faith is inescapably plain. Any independent, re-

22. "A being whom we cannot love if we would, and whom we ought not to love if we could."

23. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

24. A careful examination reveals the seeds of man-centered Socinianism; even humanism is there implicitly, but at the moment — and from Channing's own perspective — the stress is still fairly Arian, though probably not so much in doctrine as in emphasis. This was to be expected since his view of Christ had always been Arian and early American Unitarianism, over against the British variety which denied any divine qualities to Jesus, was Arian as well. See *William Ellery Channing,* David P. Edgell (Boston, 1955), pp. 22, 24, 27.

ligious experience of a "good man" is by its very nature, to add to and take away from the sacred record on the basis of personal, moral and spiritual "sensitivity." This the Transcendentalists proceeded to do, and in the very process to claim Channing as their prophet — to the latter's dismay.

Channing's weakness was not his rationalism, since he does not really take reason seriously. He actually excludes the claims of logic from those social and behavioral patterns which appeal to his feelings. This is clearly seen in his judgment that if God does not conform to an ethical standard which is, in effect, above Him, He does not deserve to be worshipped. This does not, of course, follow, for if there is a standard above God, then this standard (whatever its status may be) is the only true ultimate and God ceases to be even what Channing understands deity to be. It is not fidelity to reason but his tempermental subjectivities that led Channing astray.

2. *The development of Transcendentalism.* That Channing had opened Pandora's box was soon to be manifest in the literature that began to be imported from Europe. With his optimistic view of human nature, Channing and others expected that non-theological literature would "reinforce their regular and harmonious theology." [25] Yet, what arrived eloquently testified that in the eyes of secular man (cf. Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Cousin) even rational Unitarianism was obsolete, a superficial view of man playing about on the exterior of life and the soul.[26] What could the conservative Unitarian counter with and appeal to? Not a depraved human nature, this was denied. Not the certainties of the Book, for they had already both contradicted it in fact and theoretically implied (inconsistently, of course, with certain other emphases) that any concept drawn from experience or nature and clear and distinct would have to take precedence over the doctrines of Scripture.[27] Consider, for example, these sentiments from Channing's sermon on "Likeness to God": "Likeness to God must be a principle of sympathy or accordance with his creation; for the creation is a birth and shining forth of the Divine Mind . . . Whence do we derive our knowledge of the attributes and perfections which constitute the Supreme Being? . . . from our own souls." [28]

The efforts of the rational (vs. mystical) Unitarian to stem the tide succeeded only in stirring up interest in the new European views. Cousin's popularity militated against the earlier views since his German idealism (over-simplified) actually opposed the sensationalistic psychology of Locke and the Enlightenment upon which they rested.[29] No sooner had the Unitarians

25. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
27. Channing, *op. cit.*, p. 292.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
29. See Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

> freed liberalism from Calvinism on the basis of their version of the Lockean doctrine than they found the most advanced philosophers in Europe accusing Locke of being the author of the Deism and atheism of the French philosophers. . . . [They] learned that it was universally assumed in Europe that Hume had destroyed Locke.[30]

The reply they gave to their new philosophic opponents was simply a psychoanalysis of their thought processes as emanating from the excesses of the French Revolution. Their conclusion was: it can't happen here.[31] It didn't — for thirty years — and then came the Civil War, an eloquent refutation of the argument, if it were to be taken seriously in the first place.[32]

Philosophically, it is actually only a short step from Channing to Emerson. Although the time involved is more extended, it is an even shorter step from Emerson to Auer, Sellers, and the "Humanist Manifesto." The specific development of the thought of the Transcendentalists and the Humanists is not nearly as important for an understanding of the dialectic of Unitarianism as the *fact* of the development of these schools of thought. Before we deal, however, with the philosophic significance of a speculative theism and an axiological humanism, a sketch of the structure of each of these views needs to be before us.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, more than any other single figure, represents the Transcendentalist movement in America. He was influenced by Cambridge Platonism and its conviction that "the universe is the expression of mind, and that it is ruled by laws which are in essence moral. . . . Good is primary and from it come all things.[33] The method of insight was, as with Plotinus, mystic vision. Mingled with the other elements were "French Utopianism, German mysticism, and the romanticism of the English poets."[34] Nature was divine and was viewed as including man. Following intuition as a guide, Emerson and the Transcendentalists considered nature the Oversoul of which man was a part. One must transcend the empirical and rise to the vantage of an idealistic metaphysics in which one can view man in his true nature as a child of the one God. Influenced by the Swedenborgian interpretation of nature in terms of spiritual symbols, Emerson accepted nature as the *corpus* of revelation to be intuited by the exercise

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
32. It is interesting that later in the controversy between the older Unitarians and the Transcendentalists, the theologian of the former group, Andrews Norton, felt so inadequate to stand against the pressure of Emerson and his followers that he actually turned, in effect, to the orthodox Calvinists of Princeton for assistance. J. Alexander, A. Dod, and C. Hodge had published two studies in the *Princeton Review* analyzing destructively the position of the Transcendentalists. Norton republished these articles in 1840 as reinforcing the position of old-line Unitarianism against Transcendentalism. See Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-240. Brownson's answer to this was strong, but suggested that insofar as Transcendentalism might mean flights of fancy, he too must demur, *Ibid.*, pp. 240-246.
33. Muelder and Sears, *The Development of American Philosophy* (Boston, 1940), p. 111.
34. Werkmeister, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

of man's moral sense. Immanent divinity in man himself both makes this possible and guarantees the accuracy of the conclusions reached. The certainty of the deliverances of the intuition appear, for Emerson, to transcend even the laws of logic. "Since he was completely uninterested in coherence or consistency, he frequently contradicted himself. . . . His intuitions were his sole guide; what they revealed appeared to him self-evident." [35]

As we have set forth above, this pleasant, intuitive philosophy of the Transcendentalists, along with some of the pre-Transcendental emphases of the earlier Unitarians, continued in a rather peaceful (if not somnambulent) state until the First World War shattered nineteenth-century liberalism with its easy optimism and trust in sophisticated emotions.[36] That "shatter" is the right word here is indicated by the way in which Unitarian thesim was broadly replaced by "religious humanism." In spite of the humanist-theist controversy in the eastern United States, even here the substitution took place without appreciable difficulty in high places. The Unitarian professor of theology in Harvard Divinity School was J. A. C. F. Auer, one of the most outspoken humanists within the Unitarian church.[37]

The "Humanist Manifesto" (first draft by Roy Wood Sellars), published in 1933, asserted the self-existence of the universe, the natural emergence of man in the evolutionary procss, the non-existence of an immaterial mind, religion as "those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant," and the unacceptability of "any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values." [38] This is simply a more consistent and thorough-going out-working in the spirit of the day, of the implications of a point of view grounded on the individual's moral and spiritual sensitivities as normative. A system "without absolutes" is absolutely unable to establish itself in any stipulated position.

III. *Evaluation of the Steps in the Dissolution of Theism*

1. *Channing: the autonomy of the moral sense.* Perhaps the most pivotal doctrinal denial of classic Unitarianism was the biblical teaching of total depravity. Channing was interested in repudiating not only the Calvinistic view of man but the Arminian as well, for even the latter did not go far enough. In the interests of an anthropology that depicted man as needing to be educated rather than re-born, Channing asserted that either man is able to make moral response to God's commandments, or there is no possible ground for moral and spiritual progress. One must

35. Garnett, *Great Writers: Emerson,* p. 93, quoted in Muelder and Sears, *op. cit.,* p. 113.
36. See footnotes 19 and 20.
37. The writer studied under Dr. Auer and remembers well the tradition which surrounded the man at Harvard Divinity School. One of the most repeated tales of the awkward religiosity of his humanism centered about the great effort required when he was asked to pray in chapel. His attitude could be best summed up by two questions: "Who to?" and "What for?"
38. Werkmeister, *op. cit.,* pp. 580-581.

be able to trust the deepest moral sensitivities of his own heart, or he cannat trust anything. Now in spite of what certain Evangelicals imply as regards the basic accuracy of man's emotions (usually affirmed as an escape from the responsibilities of thinking), the Scripture looks upon the human heart and emotions (and indeed all aspects of man's being) as fallen and depraved. Because Channing will not affirm this, he is able to appeal to man's moral sense as the basis for his fundamental convictions. That he believes he finds these in the Scriptures as well is only an accidental phenomenon. The peripheral nature of the involvement of the Scripture is shown almost immediately in the development of the movement. This is borne out not only in the arrival of the Transcendentalists on the scene (with revelation in Nature, not in Scripture), but in aspects of the later thought of Channing himself. There, he increasingly appeals to man's moral intuitions to settle crucial issues. Yet, once feeling has been made the criterion, it is impossible to limit the field: unwashed as well as full-dress feelings make their way to the fore and there is no ground to do anything but admit them.

2. *Emerson: the demolition of the Christian edifice.* When Channing saw what the Transcendentalists were about, he could not understand where they derived their inspiration — and yet, he was looking on creatures of his own making. When Norton saw the scene besmirched with the messy feelings of those who were not even concerned with whether the Bible was true or not, he consulted Calvin's disciples for help. He should have known that he could not really have their help apart from having their God. Emerson and the Transcendentalists had laid hold of the principle of the autonomy of the moral feelings; they proceeded to wield it with all their might. It made a most handy weapon with which to destroy the vestigial remains of orthodoxy, which in their view clung as graveclothes to the newly released theology. One may safely say that the Transcendentalists effectively cut themselves off from any specific dependence on the Bible. This did not mean that they ceased to use it; rather, in their own use of it they chose what pleased them, what justified itself to their minds on the ground of their autonomous intuition.

They were not even careful, professional philosophers (as, for example, a number of the later humanists). They were essentially poets and *literati;* they were not biblical theologians and they were not consciously dependent on Scripture. If one wished to be somewhat unappreciative of their aesthetic and other contributions, it might be concluded that they were irresponsible as well as careless metaphysicians. But they were still philosophers much more than they were theologians in any strict sense of the latter term. Their philosophy of religion left no room for Christ, except as a good man; no room for a righteous judgment to come; no room, in fact,

for a living God. Channing's God may be pale, but one gets the impression that he is still alive; Emerson's God is hard to distinguish from nature itself. A fairly good case might be made for his philosophy being pantheistic. His God may transcend man, but the impression is hardly clear that he transcends nature. And even if one allows that Emerson's is a personal, transcendent God (in the traditional sense), what right would he have to make this affirmation beyond the deliverance of an arbitrary, independent mysticism? In fact, apart from the Scripture, it would seem impossible for any philosophy by itself to undergird the assertion of the existence of a personal God.

What exactly can speculative philosophy suggest as to the ultimate nature of reality? If one decides in favor of a metaphysical realism, one may conclude with either a non-theistic view of several possible varieties, or a theism of some sort. If the latter, most of the usual concepts will bear little resemblance to the Christian God. Even a Thomistic realism is hardly adequate to the full biblical view. And, from another point of view, the combination of orthodox Protestant theology and philosophical realism, though much more satisfying than any of the former, tells us more about theology than philosophy, since the system rests on the historicity of the biblical documents. Indeed, this goes to the heart of the matter. The introduction of a theistic concept can, from the perspective of speculative philosophy, be justified only as a postulate. What are really known are the physical nature of the universe and the facts of experience (if even these are known).

To get to a reasoned God-concept it is necessary — apart from the evidences of revelation — to show that the universe demands a personal cause. And, even if one is convinced that it is necessary to make this postulate, he must admit: (1) that this is only a postulate unsupported by any *specific* and *necessary* set of evidences, as such, and (2) that this personal cause may bear no resemblance either to the God of the Christian tradition or to the moral and spiritual preferences of the philosopher himself. Empirically, it would appear most difficult to support the God-postulate philosophically since the opposite view of a self-contained and purely natural universe, produced by the chance concatenation of matter, presents no logical contradiction and could theoretically account for all the data. Further, even if one favors the idea of God, a multitude of questions remain unanswered. Is He friendly, indifferent, or antagonistic to human values? Is he omnipotent or limited? Is he creator or simply architect of the universe and supervisor of its processes? Simply to consult the evidences of human experience is to suggest quite unpopular answers to all these questions. Apart from special revelation, philosophical theism of the realistic metaphysical sort appears to offer no stable theistic ground.

But perhaps metaphysical idealism may hold the answer. On the surface, at least, it seems much more akin to a theistic view. A careful examination reveals, unfortunately, that one is little better off in the camp of idealism than in that of realism if trying to reach rock-solid, theistic ground independently of the Scripture. It is possible to be a metaphysical idealist and hold to a view that begins and ends with this universe without conferring even a pantheistic title upon the world. The postulate of a transcendent ultimate does not necessitate a view of the absolute as personal or unitary — able idealistic philosophers (cf. Plato) have held to an impersonal but immaterial transcendent multiplicity as the ultimate ground of reality. Impersonality also seems to be an attribute of the absolute as conceived by Hegel, Bradley, and von Hartmann — to name just a few.

The objections raised to the theism of metaphysical realism would also apply here. Even if the absolute is conceived of as personal, this does not settle the kind of person he is. And, as always, the speculative ultimate is ever simply an hypothesis, perhaps a very tenuous one — certainly not a living presence with whom fellowship is not only possible but most desirable. This is illustrated in Unitarianism by the ease with which speculative theism was displaced by religious humanism. It appears that it was the temper of the philosopher rather than the logic of the evidence that determined his attitude toward theism. Certainly, there was no significant body of historical evidence that stood in the way of the reduction.

3. *The humanists: the evaporation of philosophical theism.* The humanist developed in Unitarianism out of the speculative theist. God, who had been reduced to a postulate, could be expected to put up very little resistance against complete liquidation. And, if nothing else, Unitarians have always been respectable people. Without the evidence of biblical history through trustworthy documnts, only certain broad philosophical arguments on the basis of intuitive insight stood in the way of a full-blown humanism. Thus, whether humanism would or would not develop within Unitarianism was dependent on the spirit of the age. That which was always a logical possibility could become a probability and then a reality very quickly when all that need be changed in the last instance is the temperament of the philosopher.

It was Hegelianism that Dewey abandoned to become a humanist. Auer seems to have developed his view from within the Unitarian fold itself. Emerson had earlier set the pattern by turning his back upon the Lord's supper as no longer relevant to one for whom Jesus was only human. Channing had, still earlier, accelerated a slowly rolling ball by emphasizing the independence and authority of the personal, moral sense. It all conformed to the same principle: what is not absolutely binding must be

set aside as soon as an apparently better appears; since, if man is destined to do anything, it is to throw off the superstitions of the past. Thus the realisms of one generation rapidly become the superstitions of the next, but superstitions to be gotten rid of as quickly as possible. Humanism has the recommendation of being more realistic and hard-headed than intuitive, speculative theism. Somewhat in the tradition of the earliest Unitarians, humanism seems particularly appropriate: it claims Occam's razor with a vengeance and allows nothing to stand unless it can justify itself as necessary. Also, in the spirit of Channing, it frees the movement from the sticky sentimentalism of the Transcendentalists; although it still appeals to the individual, moral sense, it avoids the mystic vision in favor of programs of slum clearance, literacy advancement, and the like.

It must be conceded that Unitarianism in the form of relegious humanism is much more down-to-earth than its predecessors. However, two large incongruities remain. First, if Emerson the Transcendentalist saw no point in continuing the observance of the Lord's Supper, should the humanist continue the "church" meeting at all? The answer given officially was an affirmative: ministers continued to be trained, religious services to be held, complete with hymns and prayers as well as sermons, and the general exercises of religion persisted almost as if these people believed in God. On the other hand, an unofficial "no" was voiced and that in explicit terms. Churches continued to close at an even more rapid rate, fewer men presented themselves as candidates for the ministry, microscopic attendance became the rule at services, and personal religious exercise just about disappeared. Officially, however, the first incongruity remained.

The second incongruity is, however, the most important in terms of the thought structure of the group. This is the inconsistency of ethics on a humanistic basis. The contradiction may be put very simply: the religious humanist passes from an affirmation of what is to what ought to be, as if there were a necessary connection between them. Naturalism (and humanism is simply a form of this) can only describe; it cannot obligate in any universal, non-hypothetical sense. It may state the personal preferences of those who compose a certain group, but it cannot show that such desires indicate what ought to be in any sense except that these objectives are preferred by certain individuals. This does not involve ethical obligation in any strict sense at all. Only an omnipotent, personal God has the right and the power to obligate; that is, to bind upon the finite person the responsibility of performing His will. On a humanistic basis, there is no absolute ground upon which to oppose the philosophy of every man for himself. Ethics are created by man, they can be destroyed by man. This last became painfully apparent after two World Wars bathed the planet

in blood. Consequently, contemporary Unitarianism is, to a great extent, moving away from humanism.

4. *Contemporary Unitarianism: theism revived.* "Now at mid-century the Kingdom of God is increasingly acknowledged to be unobtainable in human society."[39] Unitarian leaders now assure us that the liberal must prepare himself to look for the Kingdom of God not in the form of a social structure but as a spirit within the individual bearing its influence indirectly on society.[40] This is looked upon as a challenge and new resources are believed to be at hand for the accomplishment of the task.

> Paralleling the new frontiers of Unitarian organization, there has emerged in addition a new frontier of faith. . . . It is conceived not in optimism but in the . . . anxiety of the modern world. Believing that the traditional liberal answer of man's primary and ultimate dependence on his own powers to solve his problems has proved inadequate, it is willing to explore new sources of power and truth, most notably Christian theology, Existentialist philosophy and the social and personality sciences.[41]

There will undoubtedly be those who will take such statements to mean that Unitarianism is preparing to return to the Christian fold. What must not be lost sight of is the fact that even if Unitarianism became more dedicated to classic, Christian theology than Channing, there would be no real cause for rejoicing as long as the development depended on the intuitive deliverances of the moral and spiritual sense. What comes quickly may disappear just as quickly.[42] It suits the somewhat tempered post-liberal spirit to think in terms of the spiritual experience of dependence in our modern age of anxiety. However, in the empirical flux, the atmosphere of our culture is liable to be quite different almost over-night. When that change comes, the Unitarian will change too since his source and criterion of spiritual truth are the deepest feelings of his "unfallen" nature. Sociologists and social psychologists have little difficulty in showing that men's

39. Parke, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
42. It is perhaps significant that, in the midst of this new emphasis on the part of the Unitarians, the venerable *Christian Register* lost its descriptive adjective amid a great debate in which the prevailing sentiment insisted that Unitarianism was not Christian. The pastor of the influential All Saints Church, Unitarian, Washington, D.C., R. W. Stutzman, emphasized this sentiment by declaring shortly afterward that even the loose definition of a Christian as one who follows Jesus must be repudiated. See Farrell, "Can a Unitarian be a Christian?" *Christianity Today,* II, 12, March 17, 1958.

    An individual expression of the same emphasis appeared in *Faith and Freedom* (London, Autumn, 1957). In the article, "Is God Necessary," Edward Ericson confessed: "To my mind God the Father presents just about as many logical difficulties to belief as God the Son. . . . I became a Unitarian because my disbelief, my questioning of the whole approach to religion by orthodox theism, is much more fundamental and pierces to the idea of God the Father itself [26]. . . . I am opposed to any concept whatever which tends to give men a sense of dependence or reliance on any power or being whatever external to themselves" (27).

intuitive insights are suspiciously in conformity to the spirit of the age in which they live.

Modern changes in Unitarianism show nothing but the trend of intuitionism. The new positions, even when representative, are inherently incapable of any greater stability than those which have gone before. Such tendency to change is necessarily involved in any view except one which depends on an objective series of revelatory acts by an absolute, personal God.

Conclusion

Our study of the decline of Unitarianism possesses a relevance which reaches far beyond the specific movement itself. The plight of Unitarians is the plight of all liberals and the plight of all denominations under the influence of liberalism. History has shown that those groups which have been most consistently and openly liberal have most consistently failed to reach and hold the mass of the people. Compared not with the Roman Catholic approach, which is quite another thing, but with other non-Roman emphases similarly appealing to the minds and hearts of men, Unitarianism in particular and liberalism in general have achieved signal failure. Such have emptied not only the churches but the theological seminaries as well. In almost every instance, those groups which have maintained a clear-cut, biblical, supernaturalistic approach have fluorished — frequently in the very same communities where Unitarian churches were closing their doors. And this has been true not only in comparison with avowedly Unitarian societies, but within nominally evangelical denominations as well. The biblical churches have reached the people, supplied the ministers, and raised the monies, while their liberal counterparts were often having difficulty surviving.[43]

Now, it is a fact that Unitarianism as an organized movement has not fluorished, but Unitarianism as an ideology has, like leaven, penetrated all the major evangelical denominations. Its success has lain in its ability to determine the prevailing spirit of these groups — at least at the level of top authority and in the theological schools. American Protestantism consequently needs to remind itself continually of two things: (1) it has within it the seeds of its own destruction; (2) the problem can be solved only by establishing itself on God's infallibly revealed Word. The con-

43. A good illustration of this is found in a comparison of the benevolence giving of the 2100-member Park Street Congregational Church, Boston, with the giving of the rest of the 584 Congregational Churches in Massachusetts. In 1956 Park Street expended a total of $417,344 in benevolence budget alone. All the other 584 Congregational Churches in Massachusetts raised $1,193,345. This shows that one evangelical church was able to raise more than ⅓ of what over half a thousand other churches together were able to do. See 1957 *Minutes and Reports* of the Massachusetts Congregational Christian Conference, pp. 62, 79. The director of pastoral placement in the Massachusetts Conference is reported to have declared that 80% of the i.e. Churches are Liberal, 10% Unitarian, 10% Evangelical.

tinuance of reliance on the individual's moral and spiritual intuition reduces theology to merely a descriptive science of men's deeds and desires. Hope as well as authority must depart.[44]

If the Bread of Heaven from the Living God is to be given to man, rather than the stones of human speculation, only biblical theism is adequate to the task. It is not less rational but more rational than other theologies or philosophies of religion which depend in the last analysis upon a subjective experience as both the source and criterion of truth. It appeals to history and logic as the ground of its credibility. And it rests upon the verified revelation of the Living God as the authority and power of its message. It sets no store by the moral and religious sentiments of depraved man.

44. The evangelical must beware here lest he become involved in the same thing by putting his stress not on the Bible but on personal experience. It is not reason properly applied, that he was to avoid but the relativistic subjectivism of intuitional theology. The historical reliability and the over-all rationality of the Biblical view are the twin pillars upon which the Christian edifice stands. The so-called Neo-orthodoxy is deficient on both counts.

THE APOSTLE PAUL'S USE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN ROMANS 10: 5-8

RAYMOND O. ZORN

In Romans 9-11, the Apostle Paul makes clear by way of a theodicy how God in consistency with Old Testament prophecy and fulfillment can, nevertheless, reject His erstwhile covenant people, the Jews, while extending the salvation of Christ unto Gentiles who thereby become His present covenant people. The whole of this portion of Scripture makes a fascinating study and yields a number of richly rewarding insights concerning biblical truth. In this article we wish to center our attention upon just one of rather major significance; namely, the determination of Paul's method of using the Old Testament in the setting forth and establishment of his argument. A suitable passage in this connection is to be found in Rom. 10: 5-8.

> For Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, That the man which doeth those things shall live by them. But the righteousness which is of faith speaketh on this wise, Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above:) Or, Who shall descend into the deep? (that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.) But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith, which we preach.

In this passage Paul seeks to prove by two Old Testament quotations (Lev. 18: 5 in Vs. 5, and Deut. 30: 11-14 in Vss. 6-8) that the Jews stood

condemned for their unbelief by their own Old Testament Scripture which makes clear that righteousness has ever come by faith rather than through the works of the law (as was being insisted upon by them), and is received as the gift of God's grace in Christ by all who sincerely believe in Him (as Paul explicitly states in Vss. 9-10 following). In order to prove this, Paul first makes an appeal in Rom. 10: 5 to Lev. 18: 5 to show that the righteousness which the Law of Moses demands is perfect personal obedience, not simply in the outward letter but also in the inward conformity of the heart. If a man would establish his own righteousness, this is the method according to the Law. But, then, Paul goes on to give another Old Testament quotation in substance, this time from Deut. 30: 11-14, to show that by contrast the righteousness of faith is not by works but comes by the gift of God's grace to all who sincerely believe. And, as a matter of fact, it is not far off or impossible of attainment but very nigh, as accessible as sincere trust in Christ and confession of Him as Lord. The contrast, therefore, between the two quotations is obvious and that Paul has freely modified the second is also apparent.

The problem now presented to us in this passage is this; does Paul seek to show by these two Old Testament quotations that the method of justification for God's people was ever and anon by faith as could be shown even by quoting Moses, the Lawgiver, so that the Jews had no excuse for being ignorant of it? Or, is Paul only making a loose and rather arbitrary connection between his teaching and that of the Old Testament, especially when seen in the light of his obvious modification and adaptation of Deut. 30: 11-14? The answer to this question will make clear whether Paul's use of the Old Testament here was merely after the manner of allegory (discontinuity between Old Testament and New Testamnt thought), accommodation (putting New Testament thought into Old Testament language), or continuity (Old Testament prophecy culminating in New Testament fulfillment). And in the answer we reach it is hoped will also be seen an indicator to the proper understanding of Paul's use of the Old Testament elsewhere in his epistles.

I. *Allegory*

This is the view H. A. W. Meyer takes in his well-known commentary. Meyer says, in effect, that because it is so obvious that Moses speaks of law while the Apostle here is speaking of faith, no other conclusion but that of allegory is feasible. Paul, having quoted Moses in Vs. 5, continues for his own purposes to do so further in Vss. 6-8. But though he makes the language to be that of Moses as given in Deut. 30: 11-14, the thought is only his own and not that of Moses. For Moses speaks of the Law but Paul turns his statement about so that it now speaks in the language of faith. The weaknesses of Meyer's view, however, are twofold.

In the first place, such argument by the Apostle would be unconvincing to the Jews, to say the least. Paul professes earnestly his desire for their salvation (Rom. 10: 1), and then seeks to show wherein they have stumbled. Now, for him to quote in one breath Moses as stating the way of justification by keeping the Law, and then in another give a totally different way of justification by means of faith but still in the language of Moses could seem only to the Jews to be making Moses contradict himself. Furthermore, Meyer has shown that this difficulty cannot be circumvented by saying that Paul does not specifically name Moses in the second quotation but has simply taken his language and clothed it with New Testament thought; namely, that of the Apostle. Meyer, as a matter of fact, believes this but not because of a disclaimer by Paul in quoting Moses. Rather, he feels that just the opposite is the case. Paul wants Moses to state his teaching but can do so only by means of allegory. Therefore to that end, Paul, while he drops an overt reference to Moses in the second statement, nevertheless makes the allusion to him as strong as he possibly can, both grammatically and by extent of quotation, continuing into the eighth verse to clothe his doctrine in Moses' language.

But while we agree with Meyer on this point that Paul intends both quotations to be attributed to Moses, it is just here that we feel that Paul's argument would lose its force with the Jews he professes to love and about whom he says that they are ignorant as regards God's righteousness were he only employing allegory. For, in this case, Moses taught justification by the works of the Law. But Paul is teaching justification by faith. Now, this latter might even be all right as far as the Jews were concerned, but why should Paul resort to the obviously intended duplicity of trying to make his teaching that of Moses? At this point, therefore, Meyer's argument loses all force.

In the second place, to state that this is an allegory is most unsatisfactory. An allegory by definition is the interpretation of one thing in terms of another, making arbitrary connection between the thing and its interpretation. It might be asserted that Paul can do this under divine inspiration and so be giving fresh revelation. But at best it jeopardizes the unity of Scripture and furthermore remains yet to be proven in any other single case. Even in Paul's stated allegory of Gal. 4: 24 ff., there is an organic link between his teaching and the Old Testament example; namely, the inability of the works of the flesh in both Hagar's case and that of the Sinaitic Covenant to effect the realization of God's promises. Therefore, to assert that Rom. 10: 5-8 is an allegory ought only to be done as a last resort if no other possible explanation can be offered.

II. *Accommodation*

This view has been offered in explanation by such men as the Reformer, Luther, Sanday and Headlam (loosely), and C. H. Hodge, to name a few. As a position, it is midway between the allegorical view above and the continuity (Messianic fulfillment) view to be considered below. C. H. Hodge, in his commentary, describes the view of accommodation as follows, "There is nothing in the language of the Apostle to require us to understand him as quoting Moses in proof of his own doctrine" (p. 340). Accordingly, therefore, holders of this view feel that there is a decided antithesis here between the method of justification by the Law as presented by Moses and that of the righteousness of faith as presented by Paul in the Gospel. To quote Hodge again, "Moses teaches us that the legal method of justification requires perfect obedience; but the righteousness which is by faith requires no such impossibility, it demands only cordial faith and open profession" (loc. cit.). So, in effect, Moses spoke to his time with the doctrine of justification by works of the Law brought so nigh in relation to Israel that they had no excuse or "reason to complain of any insuperable difficulty in the observance of it" (Matthew Henry). However, according to the holders of this view, after Paul has stated the Old Testament method of justification clearly by means of the first quotation in Lev. 18: 5, he then takes the language of the second, Deut. 30: 11-14 (which, say they, in its Old Testament context is not basically different from the first, being but an apology for keeping the Law as stated in Deut. 30: 10), and makes it a vehicle to describe his New Testament doctrine of justification by faith. To put it in the thought of Sanday and Headlam, Paul uses the Old Testament quotation loosely as he seeks familiar, suitable, and proverbial language with which to clothe his doctrine. This view also has insuperable objections which lead to its untenability.

In the first place, it is based on the view that Paul is not using Moses to prove the doctrine of the righteousness of faith. Hodge as we have seen feels that the Apostle does not intend us to understand him as quoting Moses in proof of his doctrine. But this can only be maintained, as we have seen in the discussion of the previous view, when the extensiveness of the quotation and its parallelism of thought are ignored. To do this on the ground that the ascription to Moses is not given for the second quotation is odd indeed, especially when one notes that Paul may have had a good reason for omitting ascription to Moses in the second quotation while wishing definitely to make plain the observation that continuity with Moses' teaching was being affirmed. The explanation for the omission of Moses' name may simply lie in the obvious fact of modification of quotation. Moses speaks of "commandment" in Deut. 30: 11ff. But Paul, while using the quotattion, changes "commandment" to "the righteousness of

faith." In other words, while keeping the thrust of Moses' teaching, Paul broadens the "commandment" to include the whole doctrine of God's revelation for man's salvation as summarized in the Gospel, but as already present in the larger context of the Law to which Moses and the prophets gave witness from the time since the Protevangel of Gen. 3: 15. That is to say, justification by faith is found in the Old Testament already and is even present in this very context of Moses which Paul ultilizes, because God's promise to circumcise the hearts of His people in order that they may learn to love Him and obey Him is given in Deut. 30: 6. Paul thus would be saying that Moses had this in mind in the broad context of the passage Paul utilizes, but because he has broadened it, Paul appropriately lets "the righteousness of faith" speak instead of Moses, though it was Moses himself who said it and meant such by it.

In the second place, if Hodge is correct that "Moses teaches us that the legal method of justification requires perfect obedience, but the righteousness which is by faith requires no such impossibility", would the Jews see the force of this as the basis for their rejection by God with the subsequent calling of the Gentiles, the point which Paul is seeking to establish? Could they not rather say quite justifiably, "Moses gave this command for justification by works as you say and our fathers understood it as such. But you are now seeking, Paul, to inject a new element, justification by faith." How would Paul be able to answer this rebuttal? He couldn't, unless it was clear that Moses, too, taught justification by faith — in which their believing fathers trusted but from which they had now strayed. And that Paul does as much is clear only if we hold that he intends the Jews to see his quotation in Vss. 6-8 as to be connected with Moses' statement in Deut. 30: 11ff. The view of accommodation, therefore, also proves to be inadequate since basically it is fraught with the same weakness of the allegorical view, i.e., discontinuity.

III. *Contniuity* (*Evangelical righteousness by faith in Messianic fulfillment*)

This is the view of Calvin, W. G. T. Shedd, and others. These commentators maintain that the Apostle actually wants his readers, and the Jews, too, to understand that Moses in Deut. 30: 11-14 was already describing the evangelical righteousness which was to be had by faith in the coming Messiah. In Lev. 18: 5, it is true, he has described the basis of legal righteousness, but in Deut. 30: 11-14, he goes further and by the "commandment" means not only the Law but the whole doctrine of God which already comprehended the Gospel bound up with it. This we have previously touched upon in offering a basic continuity between Moses and the Apostle in our objection to the second view above. As both Calvin

and Shedd maintain, if this is not the proper view, then Paul's citation of the Old Testament at this point is logically worthless. That is to say, both urge a basic continuity between Moses and Paul as over against the discontinuity of allegorizing as it is to be found in the two preceding views given above.

One objection, however, against this view remains to be considered. If Moses is here teaching evangelical righteousness by faith, it should have been understood as such already by the Jews of his day. Was this in fact the case? That the Jews by the time of Paul did not understand it as such is obvious. Hence, in the opening verses of chapter 10 Paul makes clear the fact that the Old Testament doctrine of God's righteousness was something that the Jews had originally known but had subsequently modified and perverted. For God's righteousness could not be fulfilled by works of the Law, but could come only as the fruits of regeneration; hence, the necessity of God's circumcising the hearts of His people that they might love Him and live to serve Him (Deut. 30: 6). So, Paul is on firm ground when he says, "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth" (Vs. 4). That is to say, Christ is the goal to which the Old Testament law, both moral and ceremonial, conducts; and since He fulfilled it vicariously for us by meeting its precept and penalty, it no longer applies to us as a means of justification, for, as a matter of fact, it never could apply thus to us who were condemned sinners by it and unable to meet its requirements. Moses, therefore, as those before him had done and those after him were to do, announced the proximity of justification by grace, being very accessible to his hearers, and received by faith, the truth of which was brought to full realization in the crucified and risen Saviour in Whom a saving trust must be placed that emanates in unashamed confession of Him as Lord. Had the Jews really heard and followed Moses and the prophets, they would have been led to this as Paul here so plainly shows. For he was simply preaching what they had announced and what God had fulfilled in Christ. Whether it were the Jews of their time, or the Jews and Gentiles of Paul's day, the principle of justification was the same; namely, righteousness to be imputed by faith in God's Redeemer.

Paul, therefore, does not quote the Old Testament in the arbitrary interpretation of the allegorical form, nor simply in the loose fashion of familiar, suitable, and proverbial language, but effectively, *ad sensum,* in an organic relationship with that of prophecy and promise of the Old Testament which now had found fulfillment in the Christ of the Gospel he so eloquently proclaimed.

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: EMPIRICAL OR METAPHYSICAL?

W. STANFORD REID

Historical materialism has for nearly a century, if not longer, been regarded by those who accept it as the only key to history which will give "scientific results." Indeed, so widely was this point of view accepted during the twenties and early thirties of the present century, that practically all historical problems whether they related to Greek art, the Reformation or the growth of scientific knowledge were explained in Marxist materialistic categories. Although today this interpretation is perhaps not taken quite so seriously, it still forms the basis, whether conscious or unconscious, of many students' interpretations of events, despite those same students' definite rejection of historical materialism itself. It would, therefore, seem to be advisable to see whether it is as infallibly empirical an interpretation as it asserts, or whether it is in truth simply one among a number of immanent "metaphysical" analyses of the historical process.

It is a truism to say that historical materialism in its present form finds its origins in the writings of Marx and Engels. They laid the foundations for later elaboration which have appeared in the writings of various individuals today, perhaps one of the best known being Professor Maurice Dobb of Cambridge University. Besides applying this interpretation to a number of studies, Professor Dobb in 1951 summed up the materialistic "philosophy" in an article in *History*. Although relatively short for such an important subject, the article seems to epitomize this point of view so adequately that in the present discussion, continual reference will be made to it.[1]

I

If there is one basic principle upon which Marx and all his successors have insisted it is that they are, more than anyone else, empirical. Marx in his preface to the second edition of *Capital* stressed this repeatedly, pointing out that while he had employed the Hegelian dialectic as his method of exposition, he had in fact rescued it from the "upside-down" position in which Hegel had unfortunately placed it. In the same vein Dobb in his article stresses that "historical materialism originated in the antithesis" to Hegel's view that every step in the historical process is determined by the "idea" or "conception" of the times. Historical materialists claim that such an interpretation being fundamentally metaphysical, they have turned from it to examine history scientifically and empirically, refusing to permit philosophy, and more especially metaphysics, to influence their interpretations.[2]

1. Dobb, Maurice, "Historical Materialism and the Role of the Economic Factor," *History*, N.S. XXXVI (1951), 1-11.
2. Dobb, pp. 1 and 2; cf. K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, (London, [1936]), pp. 88f.

Such a point of view naturally appeals to those who have been much impressed with the wonders of applied science and who have come to doubt fine-spun philosophical theories. The historical materialist, refusing to accept any "dogmas," begins his interpretation with the facts empirically discovered. On this basis he very quickly comes to the important conclusion that "the determining element in history is *ultimately* production and reproduction in real life."[3] The economic factor is the most basic of all forces in the historical process. At the same time, however, the historical materialist also believes that the ideas and concepts originally arising out of the economic ground-motive of history, reciprocally influence and so modify, the economic forces. But when all this has been said the economic factor is still ultimate, the "mode of production" the foundation of all history.

This raises the question of the meaning of "the mode of production." Dobb in his article points out that the Marxist interpretation has been frequently misinterpreted by being limited to nothing more than the technology of production. The true position of the historical materialist would seem to be that by this term he means the whole complex of production which includes both the "forces of production" and the "social relations of production."[4] These give rise to all the other phenomena of history, and they in turn exercise a reciprocal influence upon their prime-movers.

A question which arises at this point is: how empirical are these conclusions? The problem would seem to be the same as that of the man who desires to determine which comes first, the chicken or the egg. Does the historical materialist in devising the economic interpretation, actually begin with empirical observation, or does he commence by making certain universal assumptions involving the nature of things in general? If he does the latter, can one draw any other conclusion than that his reasoning finds its starting point in a metaphysic, or more accurately in an act of materialistic "religious" faith?

Before considering the matter further at this point, one must examine carefully the historical materialist's understanding of the process of history. To him, in accordance with his assumption of the fundamental character of the economic factor, the basic drive in history is a dialectical conflict between economic classes, whom one might almost denominate as the "haves" and the "have-nots." As Dobb has stated it: "In this sense divisions between political groups or parties and between ideologies were derivative from the tension within the social relationships of production."[5] It is this dialectical conflict which produces all features of culture, thought and civilization. Yet while very certain that this position is the only "empirical"

3. Engels quoted in Dobb, p. 3; cf. Marx, pp. 92, 93.
4. Dobb, p. 10.
5. Dobb, p. 10; cf. also K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Communist Manifesto."

one, Dobb, basing his assertion upon Marx as his final authority, declares: "That the shaping of individuals by their social *milieu* and of social groups by their relations to the mode of production is a simple formula which can yield a direct answer to every historical problem, no serious Marxist has ever maintained." Moreover, he quotes Engels' statement that the materialist interpretation is a guide for study, not a lever for construction.[6] For this reason while the materialistic interpreter asserts that his economic interpretation of history ultimately explains all historical phenomena, he also admits that the connections between many historical phenomena (e.g. art, religion, etc.) and their basic cause are never empirically verifiable.

Naturally, this again raises the point: is then historical materialism empirical? The materialist claims to be rigidly scientific, but at the same time allows that he has not been able to demonstrate the link between economic causation and many cultural phenomena. In other words, although he states categorically that there is causal relationship between the economic factor, i.e., the mode of production, and contemporary civilization, when one demands empirical proof of this generalization he acknowledges it to be but an assumption. It would seem that here again, although he claims to accept only the results of scientific investigation, there is behind the materialist a whole series of unconsciously introduced metaphysical ideas. Can one then accept his claim that his position is truly empirical?

This leads to a further step. One of the important characteristics of science is that it is able to project its conclusions into the future to make predictions concerning physical events yet to happen. For instance, Halley was able to predict the time of the reappearance of a comet which had already been seen a number of times before. With his "scientific" method can the historical materialist do the same thing?

The answer of Marx and his disciples is an unequivocal affirmative. While Dobb on the other hand, in his article does not specifically touch upon this matter, the implications as we shall see are that prediction is definitely possible. Other historical materialists have, like Marx, carried their theory through to the bitter end, declaring that the inevitable culmination of history will be revolution which will produce the classless society. They are thus, on the basis of the scientific study of the past, able to predict a future revolution, and not content with that, to state what will be the state of affairs after the revolution.[7]

Such a conclusion, however, seems to be hardly scientific. A true revolution, by its very nature, tears up the old in order to introduce something principally new. True there have usually been connections between the

6. Dobb, pp. 7, 8.
7. "Communist Manifesto"; F. Engels, *Socialism Utopian and Scientific* (New York, 1935), pp. 69ff.

pre-revolutionary and the post-revolutionary state of affairs, as far as *historical* revolutions are known. But these upheavals according to Marx, have all been only partial. The proletarian revolution, on the other hand, will be the revolution to end all revolutions. It will be total. Now, apart from the question of how he is able to predict at all on the basis of a study of the past, there is the question of how one may prophesy from the pre-revolutionary situation, what will be the state of affairs after the completion of the revolution. To this query there seems to be hardly a "scientific" answer, rather it seems to be based upon metaphysical assumptions, the very existence of which Dobb, Marx and all other historical materialists are constrained to deny.

II

This suspicion that Dobb, Engels, Marx and other historical materialists actually presuppose a metaphysical system behind history is borne out by their denials of ultimate historical relativism. Dobb is very insistent upon this, rejecting any idea that his views are really only a "sociology of knowledge," and that there are both "bourgeois" and "proletarian" truths about history. For all this school's rejection of relativism, however, one cannot but find its "absolutism" a little difficult to swallow. If the "mode of production" ultimately determines all forms of human society and thought, as the mode of production changes so must thought change and with it, even historical materialism. Moreover, it would seem that the views of different social classes would vary according to the current mode of production at different times. While everyone might be considered to be out of step except the proletariat, one must realize that even the proletariat's economic position changes bringing alterations in its "world view." This would be particularly true once the ultimate social revolution had taken place. Consequently even historical materialism would seem to have been relativized and with it all and every interpretation of history.

As Dobb has pointed out, such a conclusion is as far from the desires of the materialists as it could be. Wherever and whenever they write they sound like the prophets of the Old Testament in their assurance, the fundamental difference being that while the prophets always prefaced their words with "Thus saith the Lord," Dobb and others usually commence by quoting Marx, or assume the self-evident character of their basic materialistic assumption. The opening sentence of part three of Engels' *Socialism Utopian and Scientific* brings this out clearly: "The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life, and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure. . . ." Assuming the absolute validity of such a premise, it is hardly surprising that Dobb, to refute the charge of relativism, should hold all interpretations of history to have some elements of

"truth" in them, those that are more scientifically materialistic being closer to "absolute truth" than those that are less scientific. "Absolute truth was not a Kantian unknowable, even if it could never be reached at any finite point in the historical process: it could be approached asymptotically, and criteria existed by which one could speak about being nearer to it or more remote."[8]

While this sounds quite plausible, one is still left in something of a quandary, since on the basis of historical materialism, it is rather difficult to discuss "absolute truth." What is it? Presumably it has certain characteristics by which it may be known, but how one may discover these characteristics in the womb of ultimate materialism is not stated. Indeed, at this point there seems to be another basic inconsistency in the whole system of thought. The historical materialist knows only individual historical "facts," which are individual entities without connection. Of course he will claim that there are connections, but without any basic principle of unity which he knows "scientifically," they are in truth not related. Any principle of coherence which he may attempt to adopt is purely the concoction of his own "materialistically" determined mind. This gives no more than a working hypothesis, and certainly not "absolute truth."

Yet such a suggestion as this by no means satisfies the historical materialists. They talk as though there is an absolute principle of coherence in and over history. Dobb, for instance, in the sentence quoted above apparently accepts the idea of absolute truth, and Marx, although he may not have used the term, still presupposed the absoluteness of the dialectical movement of history towards a classless society. This would seem to be in direct conflict with their denial of everything but the facts of the material universe.

To this charge of innate contradiction and of a hidden metaphysic the historical materialist may well reply that he and his fellows are not talking of an "idea" in the sense of Hegel, but merely of the observed process in nature and history. True, but when they begin to make this process absolute, and on the basis of its absolutism to predict the future, it would seem to be more than a mere hypothesis. Moreover, their firm belief that although unknown until the nineteenth century, this process has always been going on, points to its existence as something which is more than a mere haphazard accident. Since it is innate in nature and history it would seem to be eternally absolute.[9]

If this be the case, it would seem that this "absolute truth" is not subject to history itself, whose very essence is, according to the dialectical

8. Dobb, p. 9.
9. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, pp. 97f., 103f.

materialist, the dialectical movement of change. No matter what happens in history, the same "absolute truth" is always there as a supra-historical entity, unaffected by the laws of movement. Thus the historical materialists claim that his "absolute truth" is only the observed process of nature seems hardly to fit the case. He has assumed in truth the existence of a metaphysical "idea" which dwells in a realm outside of history.

At this point he is unable to stop, for he has already laid great stress upon the existence of this "idea," this "absolute truth" or whatever one may call it, in history. Indeed it is the very life blood of history, working itself out through economic evolution and social conflict, with the end result that history is made to conform to it. If one looks closely at this idea it is hard to escape the conviction that once again Hegel has appeared, albeit in a somewhat unexpected guise. Although Marx, Engels and their cohorts have always been very scornful of Hegel, it looks as though he has infiltrated their lines as a metaphysical fifth column.

At this point another question arises. If this absolute "idea" or "truth" does mould history to its pattern, how does it do so? It is above history and yet within it, but by what means are the two connected? How is it that history with all its change and movement continues to follow out this predetermined pattern which will eventually lead to the classless society? To this the historical materialist returns no answer. Rejecting, of course, anything like a doctrine of creation or a pantheistic-idealistic philosophy, he does not bother to solve this very crucial problem. Hardly a scientific approach!

III

The reason for this lacuna in his reasoning may of course come from the difficulty of proving that he may know the criteria whereby one may even obtain a glimpse of his "absolute truth." Or, to put the matter in the form of a question: how does he know that the dialectical process is fundamental to history, and how does he know that it is going to bring in the good, the true and the beautiful classless society? True, he claims that he has discovered this by "historical research." But out of historical research what does he bring forth? It would seem that he is able to produce only facts not necessarily connected, which leave him with no real scientific knowledge, and certainly with no certainty or assurance that the "absolute truth" will be eventually worked out in history.

To understand the facts, the historical materialist must know their relationships. Moreover, to make valid generalizations concerning the whole process of history, of which he is a part, he must know all their relationships, otherwise his absolute generalizations and his absolute certainties concerning the basic idea or process of history must fall to the ground. This is par-

ticularly true when the historian ceases to be a historian and turns prophet. To make predictions on the basis of his knowledge of past history, he projects his ideas into the area of the non-factual by stating what will happen after the proletarian revolution. Such a point of view would be consistent with the faith of the Old Testament prophets, but it is hardly appropriate for materialists who deny the existence of a god, and so fundamentally reject any possibility of a valid pre-interpretation of anything in the universe. Where then does the historical materialist obtain his knowledge? What is the origin of his omniscience? To these queries he gives no adequate answer.

When one attempts to analyze his ideas, however, one quickly comes to realize that his views are again dependent upon a series of basic assumptions. To establish his epistemology he begins with the idea of a coherent universe in which everything is related. Only on this ground could Dobb, for instance, assume that the method of production determines the contemporary religion, art and philosophy for he himself admits that such a view cannot be substantiated from the historical facts. To carry the matter a little further, this assumption also seems to be at the root of his idea of "absolute truth" for he feels that all thought can approach in some way or other within hailing distance of the truth, even though it may fall far short of it. It is for this reason that, while denying the possibility of divine revelation concerning reality, he holds very strongly to the ability of man, and in particular the historian, to know truth and to know the idea behind the whole historical development. His position rests upon the two assumptions of "a coherent universe" and "absolute truth," neither of which he has proved or seems able to prove.

How, therefore, does he know all this? It would seem to be that he has taken his presuppositions, applied them to the facts and produced his results. In other words, despite the tremendous paraphernalia of historical scholarship, and despite the importance of much of the work which the historical materialist has accomplished, his system rests not upon a scientifically and empirically developed system of thought, but on a process of rationalization which has deduced certain consequences from basic presuppositions and has then fitted the facts into the logically derived theories. The results of this process can hardly be called scientific. In actual truth he can have no certainty that his knowledge of either "the absolute truth" beyond history, or its relationship to history has any validity whatsoever. Once again he ends up with an ultimate contradiction between what he claims to do and what he actually does. His theory of knowledge cannot bear the weight of what he claims is the nature of reality.

IV

There is, however, one more point which must be made, and this relates to the matter of ethics. Although Marx and all his followers are strong on the fact that they are purely scientific and that everything is ultimately determined by the natural dialectic of the economic and social struggle, there is always a strongly ethical tone to their writing. There is forever the condemnation of the exploiters of the proletariat which finds its classic expression in the *Communist Manifesto*. This tone is not merely a mid-nineteenth century vestigial remain, but is essential to the whole pattern of the historical materialist's thought. Since the workers of the world have nothing to lose but their chains, they should unite to throw off the horrible bondage under which they suffer. Revolution becomes a moral responsibility upon which men turn their backs at their peril.

This attitude poses a rather important problem. On the basis of the historical materialist's acknowledged presuppositions how is it possible for there to be any moral, any good or bad, acts? What is the difference between good and bad; and whence does knowledge of them come? But there is also another side to this problem. Even admitting that "good" and "bad" do exist as valid differences, since society is fundamentally determined by purely materialistic forces outside the individual, how is the latter responsible for what he does? Why condemn the bourgeoisie for its exploitation of the proletariat, when the bourgeoisie itself is simply the product of the dialectical process of economic evolution? The historical materialist has to face the problem of whether or not there is such a thing as human responsibility, and if there is, of its significance.

As one reads Marx and his disciples one cannot but gather that one's attitude to the proletariat is a rule by which one's morality is measured. Acts which favour and help the proletariat are good, those which are against them and to their disadvantage are bad. This is true, however, only on a "long term basis," for Marx and others have pointed out that sometimes one might take actions which are ostensibly for the welfare of the proletariat but which in the end do not help them on towards the great revolution. For this reason he had no love for liberals who sought the reform but not the complete overthrow of the capitalistic system. The motive, therefore, as well as the act itself one must take into account if one is truly to judge its ethical status.

Here again "absolute truth" raises its head. "The idea" which determines the course of history, driving it on to the classless society, seems to be really the ultimate standard of action. It is this idea which the historical materialist uses as his means of criticizing history, societies and individuals, relegating them to "the good" or "the bad." Moreover, it is

on the basis of this idea that he proclaims ultimately the "rightness" of the eventual appearance of the classless society.

While this may sound very logical, one cannot help asking the question: by what authority is the idea of the welfare of the proletariat declared to be "the good"? Does it derive from the Christian: blessed are the poor (Lk. 6: 20f.)? Or does it come from the thinking of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill? The historical materialist does not say. It is apparently merely his decision and that of other historical materialists, that the welfare of the proletariat should be the primary concern of everyone, and is the highest end and objective of historical development.

When one states such a position, he is forced back to the fact that the idea of the "good" is entirely a human creation, arising out of the social process caused by the dialectic of economic development. It would seem, therefore, that ethics at this point become purely relative. They are nothing more than the standards of a certain form of economic and social society which may change at any time as a result of a change in the mode of production. Yet in the face of this his own interpretation, the historical materialist still lays down the "idea" of the welfare of the proletariat and progress to the classless society, as being the objective for which every right thinking person should work. Here, as in the case of his metaphysics and his epistemology, there seems to be a fundamental contradiction.

V

Thus if one attempts to make an analysis of the dogmatic statements of the historical materialist, he inevitably finds that the latter's claims to scientific and empirical accuracy and certitude are in no way consistent with his basic presuppositions. While declaring himself to be free of philosophical ideas, he actually turns up with an assumed metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, at the core of which is the basic belief in a pattern of history which finds its expression in the dialectical movement of time towards the classless society.

Yet, as noted above, while assuming such an array of philosophical constructions, he flatly denies that he makes them. He declares that the economic factor, its study and measurement, is the only real force which interests him, for it is the only real motive of history. He is scientific and opposed to such unscientific practices as the making of assumptions, but at the same time he covertly adopts them and uses them for his own purposes. One sometimes wonders whom he thinks he is fooling.

One may, however, carry this criticism even further. If for the sake of argument, one admits the truth of the historical materialist's position, one is obliged to ask by what right he makes any generalizations, particularly

concerning that most difficult of all studies, history. Moreover, on what basis can he make generalizations about anything scientific, since if there is no existence but material, no knowledge but that derived from history, and no moral imperative except that which comes from a certain mode of production at a certain point in time and space, ultimate chance would seem to rule? It would thus appear that historical materialism destroys itself by its own profession. It must either retire into the corner and make no statements about anything, or it must begin by assuming a whole complex of reality behind the material universe, the understanding of which must be obtained by some other means than empirical observation and measurement.

In this dilemma the historical materialist is not alone, for it would seem that all immanent systems of philosophy have the same difficulty. Making man the creator of the system of explanation, they are unable to rise above the limitations of the relativism of history. Even if they attempt to remain in this completely relativistic situation, they still have their problems, for once they begin to make universal judgments they are presupposing a state of affairs which can hardly be said to find its ultimate proof in a small segment of reality, or even of history. They are taking for granted that there is a fundamental coherence in the universe, by which it is possible to interpret reality, and that there is meaning to history which is above and beyond the changing patterns of historical events. In other words, the philosopher of history is forced to assume a supra-historical reality, if he is to make any statements about history as a whole.

Such an assumed supra-historical reality can perhaps be termed the philosopher's religion. It is his basic standpoint from which he begins all his thinking, and it is thus supra-theoretical, accepted by an intuitive faith. The question then arises as to whether or not this faith is valid — does it make sense of the universe, and in this particular case, the process of history? Here is the real crux of the whole question of historical materialism. As we have seen, this philosophy of history accepts on faith a supra-theoretical starting point which, almost immediately afterwards, in order to maintain its desired materialism, it must perforce deny. This hardly makes for a logical or a scientific philosophy of history, and it will hardly therefore present an explanation of historical events which one may regard as being valid.

VI

In the light of the failure of historical materialism to be truly scientific, is there any answer to this riddle of history? From the human point of view, one might well answer in the negative, for how can man, within time and subject to time, discover a point of vantage from which he is able to see history as a whole and so derive an understanding of its pattern and its meaning? To such a question neither materialistic

science nor idealistic philosophy provides anything but guesses for an answer. It is at this point that Christianity comes in, offering a realistic, self-consistent interpretation which gives meaning to history and so to human action.

The basic reason for stating that Christianity can solve this ever present problem is, that of all interpretations of history it alone accepts frankly man's inability by himself to interpret history. Even the historian who holds that history is but the operation of chance is inconsistent in making a general interpretative statement. The Christian, on the other hand, believes that general statements and judgments may be made concerning history because there is a supra-historical interpreter who has made a prehistorical interpretation. The interpreter is the sovereign Triune God, the creator, upholder and ruler of the universe who "does all things according to the counsel of his own will" (Eph. 1:11).

At the same time the Christian knows only too well that men do not wish to accept such a solution to the problem. They usually prefer to have chance rather than the sovereign God as the final arbiter of history. At this the Christian can feel no surprise, for believing that man is a morally responsible being, he is also sure that man desires to assert himself in history by refusing God His true glory. Therefore, man turns himself away from God, the result being sin and evil in history. But this evil is not the economic determinism of the historical materialist; rather it is the evil arising out of the wilful disobedience of the rebellious creature who refuses to worship the Creator, and so seeks for a simple, unitary and immanent explanation for all historical development.

Man's wilfulness and sin can have only one result: blindness. Consequently although by God's favour the non-Christian may discover much concerning the immediate connections of historical facts, when he comes to making general statements, or even to proving that he has the ability to uncover the immediate facts and their relations in history, he lands in complete inconsistency. The Christian would hold, however that man's rejection of God as the ultimate interpreter will be changed to acceptance only by God's gracious act of giving man sight. When he is then able to see properly, he will understand the truth of the Christian position.

Man even before he sinned must needs have revealed to him the meaning and significance of history, but since sin and disobedience has entered into creation man needs more than revelation. He needs redemption, which will open his eyes and turn him back to true faith and obedience. This the Christian believes has come in history through God's

self-revelation in His redemptive action culminating in the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Son, all of which is recorded in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Thus the Word, both living and written, gives men the true explanation and understanding of the meaning of history.

The Christian, therefore, standing in the midst of history, and realizing that to interpret history one must always commence with certain supra-theoretical assumptions, begins with an acceptance of the Gospel and all that it means, while over against him stands the non-Christian endeavouring from the facts of history to discover its ultimate meaning. For the non-Christian the end result is always the same as that to which the historical materialist has come: inconsistency and self-destruction. For the Christian, however, beginning with the revelation of the sovereign God, there is no inconsistency, nor is there any destruction of history. Although he realizes that he cannot know everything about history, he believes that it is coherent in God's purpose of which he can comprehend at least a small part. Thus when he talks of an understanding of history as a whole, he does so not on the basis of the accumulation of historical data, but ultimately on that of the revealed counsel of God. In this he is consistent and can deal with all historical facts as they come, knowing that they are God's historical revelation of Himself.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Jesus and the Word, by Rudolf Bultmann, translated by Louise Pettibone Smith and Erminie Huntress Lantero. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. x and 226 pp.

Jesus Christ and Mythology, by Rudolf Bultmann. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. 96 pp. $1.95.

The first of these two books was published in German in 1926. The second is lectures delivered at Yale and Vanderbilt Universities in 1951. Both are timely because of Professor Bultmann's appointment as visiting professor at Syracuse University.

The first book presents in concentric circles, Jesus and His message, beginning with the historical background; then turning to Jesus' teachings, first, of the Kingdom of God; next, within this circle, of the teaching regarding God as at once near and remote.

The treatment of the historical background is suggestive, though less valuable than that in Sherman E. Johnson's *Jesus in His Homeland* (1957). Much of the comment on Jesus' teachings about the Kingdom of God and His will is helpful. The section on "The Jewish Conception of God" is

thought-provoking. Some parts of the book are, to evangelicals, merely provoking.

Bultmann's treatment of the events of the Gospels as "superhistorical" reminds one that Nietzsche's Superman was after all a man. The supernatural from man's viewpoint, is natural to God. So today a supermarket is still a market.

Bultmann's philosophy of history is neither as intelligible nor as credible as Jacques Maritain's in his *On the Philosophy of History* (1957).

The second book is an existentialist thesis concerning Jesus Christ. It rests on the premise that modern man, because of science, cannot believe the historical truth of the miracles in the Bible. Both books rest on an assumed restoration of the "original sayings of Jesus," plus layers added by the primitive Jewish Church and by Hellenistic Christianity.

Evangelicals therefore must be atavistic as well as obscurantist. We see no need of "demythologizing," because to us the Gospels are not myths in the first place — not even in the sophisticated meaning of "myth" as defined by Bultmann.

Dr. Bultmann is not a man to be overlooked. He has insights which will widen one's intellectual horizon. But he is caviar, rather than halibut filet, not nourishing as a steady diet. And there is serious danger that, if you believed him, you would cry, "He has taken away my Lord, and I know not where he has laid Him."

— Emmet Russell

The Structure of Christian Ethics, by Joseph Sittler. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958. 90 pp. $2.50.

This book is not, as the title might suggest, a systematic statement of Biblical Ethics, nor is it a formulation or exposition of Christian moral principles. Rather, it is an essay on the Christian life and, as such, was found by the reviewer to be rewarding, significant and timely. Professor Sittler writes from the Lutheran tradition but speaks to the whole Christian community.

The first of the three brief chapters attempts to describe and explain "The Confusion in Contemporary Ethical Speech." Christian ethical discourse, according to Sittler, is often confused and distorted because of the "transposition of the organic vitality of Biblical speech into the abstract, intellectualized and propositional form of Western theology." Ethical commands, and thus the Christian's ethical thoughts and deeds, are not organically related to God, the ethical commander. As a result, the dynamics of the Christian ethic is in danger of being transformed into an abstract, formal system of morality, which may be used as an instrument to serve man's selfish and sinful purposes.

But if the Christian ethic is not an abstract system of morality, neither is it an amorphous, unstructured, or sentimental "love ethic." Rather the Christian life must be seen as a response to what God has done and is doing in creation, redemption, and sanctification. The Biblical view presents the Christian ethical life as a life of faith. If love as such cannot be commanded, it is because love cannot be understood apart from faith. For love is a function of faith, a faith-doing. The Christian life, the faith active in love, has a characteristic style, shape, structure, form, pattern. The basis for this pattern is the New Testament view of the continuity of the Christ-Life and the Christian life. "The Christian life is here understood as a re-enactment from below on the part of men of the shape of the revelatory drama of God's holy will in Jesus Christ . . . suffering, death, burial, resurrection a new life."

The content of this new life, of love, can be fully revealed to the believer only in obedience to the Divine Will. The absolute command and the absolute loyalty are realized only in the changing, historical situations These situations open up ever-new possibilities for one's response to God and one's service to man. These possibilities, with their immediacy and complexity, often lead to terrifying and heart-breaking demands for decisions: these "crucifixions" may lead to paralysis unless related to the forgiveness wrought by the Crucifixion. Thus the whole world can be the field for the love manifested by faith. However, the quest for human justice can never be equated with that love, although justice may be an instrument of love.

Sittler's statement is enriched by suasive insights and by a fresh, at times poetic, style. His comments on literature are especially suggestive (pp 16-23). He interprets a long line of literary figures, from Boccaccio and Cervantes to Shaw and Tennessee Williams, as an extended commentary on Christian morality. These perceptive writers, many of whom have the core of the Christian message fairly straight, can serve as goads to the Christian by laying bare the pretensions and shortcomings of the "Christian behavior" of individuals and of the Christian community.

If many questions are left unanswered, if the sketch is incomplete and often cryptic, nevertheless the essay may serve as a spur and a guide to one's thinking and acting. It is a beginning, not an arrival — an essay, not a definitive answer. — *Fred Brouwer*

The Epic of Unitarianism, by David B. Parke. Boston: Starr King Press 1957. xii + 164 pp. $3.50.

The publisher assures the reader that this volume makes available "important documents in the Unitarian tradition, some rare and obtainable only in collections, some translated here for the first time . . . all are mile-

stones in the 400 years of Unitarian development. They are offered together under one cover for the first time." Discounting a seller's understandable enthusiasm for his product, it appears nonetheless that this is a valuable little book — to Unitarians especially, also to Liberals, and even to the Orthodox, who have much to learn of their own errors and weaknesses in the light of the growth and accomplishments of Unitarianism.

Judging by the dates, it appears that the author may have presented to us here an extension of his B.D. thesis. At any rate, the fact that the book was published only two years after his graduation from seminary (Meadville) suggests that Mr. Parke's youth may account in part for an enthusiasm that seems rarely evident in Unitarian circles. Yet, there is not only enthusiasm here. Parke has handled his materials well, offered good editorial comment, and manifested an awareness that if there is to be a significant future for Unitarianism, the movement will have to learn even from existentialism.

The materials are arranged by centuries beginning with the sixteenth. "Antitrinitarianism and Toleration." After discussing the seventeenth century in terms of the heresy of Socinianism at its maturity and treating the eighteenth in terms of the problem of authority, he reaches his longest single chapter: "Individualism and Denominationalism" (the nineteenth century). The concluding chapter on the twentieth century recognizes the tension in modern Unitarianism between humanism and theism. It is disappointing to note that the text proper closes with an essay dated 1946 One immediately wonders if nothing significant has transpired in the last eleven years A helpful list of sources completes the work.

With all his openness to other viewpoints, it is disappointing to find that Parke treats Calvin as somewhat of a monster. Calvin participated in the Servetus case, he says, "only enough to be sure that Servetus would be found guilty"(7). A careful reading of the original documents suggests that this is not only an unsympathetic but indeed an external approach to the issue. Forced to admit that it was not Calvin by himself who was responsible for Servetus' burning, he infers that the Reformer had no other desire than to "get his man." This points up the fact that the volume is not a dispassionate arrangement of data of historical significance only, but a partisan tract. As such, it is not a polemic adjusted to the modern cultural and intellectual scene, but rather a collection of utterances that seem important to the Unitarian mind. Evaluated from the viewpoint of its purpose — and considered sympathetically and internally rather than externally alone — it is a significant publication. Indeed it is a proper reference work for the bookshelves of the Orthodox.

The direction of modern Unitarianism may well be foreshadowed in Parke's view of "a new frontier of faith . . . conceived not in optimism but

in the chaos, suffering, and anxiety of the modern world. Believing that the traditional liberal answer of Man's primary and ultimate dependence on his own power to solve his problems has proved inadequate, it is willing to explore new sources of power and truth, most notably Christian theology, Existentialist philosophy and the social and personality sciences" (149). To an unrepentant Evangelical, this sounds as if Unitarianism is about ready to become something else, if it has not already become so.

—Lloyd F. Dean

Christ and Celebrity Gods: The Church and Mass Culture, by Malcolm Boyd. Greenwich, Connecticut: The Seabury Press, 1958. 145 pp. $3.50.

In his first book, *Crisis in Communication: A Christian Examination of the Mass Media,* the Rev. Malcolm Boyd writes, "It is the difficult task of the church both to employ the implements and techniques of public relations and publicity in doing its missionary work — and, as a part of its mission in the world, to stand in judgment upon these implements and techniques." In his second book, *Christ and Celebrity Gods,* Mr. Boyd further develops this theme and at the same time challenges the Christian to understand the negative witness of the world in order that he may minister more effectively to the world's needs through the positive witness of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. "This," he says, "is not an easy task, because men are so pre-occupied today with negative witness — with the glamor of evil, the fascination of sin, the fantastic structure of chaos, the decadence of disintegration, the haunting sadness of meaninglessness, the desperate cohesion of false community, the restless insecurity of impermanence" (6).

As a former producer and advertising man Boyd knows the celebrity world, and he is thorough and unsparing in his examination of the "celebrity cult" both outside and inside the Church. Mass media of communication have helped to create the "celebrity gods"; and when the Church uses these media for purposes of evangelization, she must take care that her "religious celebrities" do not obscure rather than glorify God.

A large portion of the book is devoted to an excellent critical history of the Hollywood religious film from its inception through the production of Cecil B. DeMille's $13,500,000 film *The Ten Commandments.* Many so-called religious films are, Boyd claims, anything but biblical. Even *The Ten Commandments,* which he alludes to as "an achievement of massive technical excellence," has resorted to fabrication. "Surely," he writes, "scriptural fundamentalists and liberals alike will still maintain some respect for the Holy Bible as at least the primary source of information about Moses! When we introduce fictional elements into the story of the Bible we do our faith and its evangelism a major disservice" (57-58). Because of the attempt to appeal to as many people as possible and because of the problems

of realism, symbolism, and script involved in producing the religious motion picture, the picture often results in exalting aspects of our culture rather than demonstrating the relationship of God to man.

Much that we have branded secular Mr. Boyd shows to be of religious significance. "Contemporary art, in all its forms, has set before us much negative witness of Man's estrangement from his Maker and his brother, and to his failure to know himself" (80). In his analysis of a number of secular films, he points us to groups of people whose lives lie "outside the acknowledged grace and sovereignty of God" (6). It is the responsibility of the Christian to be able to show others the emptiness, loneliness, and frustration to which rejection of Christ leads and to bring to them "the healing message of the Gospel of Jesus Christ."

Mr. Boyd would not have the Church ignore the mass media of communication in preaching the Gospel, but he challenges her to use them in a Christian manner, for "the Gospel stands in judgment upon the means employed to communicate it to mankind" (135). "And, in approaching any TV or radio show or film or press publication, we do not, in Christ's name, so much seek to use the given medium as to be involved in the medium through, and in, God's Holy Spirit" (130).

Christ and Celebrity Gods is a wholesome challenge to the Church to evangelize our society rather than to be evangelized by it, and in the process of evangelization to use thoroughly Christian methods. There is to be no compromise with the gods of this world. —*Frances E. White*

BRIEF NOTICES

Brighter than a Thousand Suns, by Robert Jungk. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958. xiv, 369 pp. $5.00.

A history of the men who developed the atomic and hydrogen bombs with an impact apt for its subject. Weaves into the tissue of this facet of the history of the last fifty years the challenges, achievements, and disappointments of some of the world's great scientific minds. Should be read with such as Compton's *Atomic Quest,* Goudsmit's *Alsos,* Bertin's *Atom Harvest,* and an article and review such as in the *Bull. of the Atomic Scientists* for October to balance various distortions, but nevertheless, must-reading for anyone seeking to clarify the ethical and political questions around these fearsome weapons. —*T.H.L.*

Science Speaks: An Evaluation of Certain Christian Evidences, by Peter W. Stoner. Chicago: Moody Press, 1958. 127 pp. 35¢ paper.

Written in the tradition of concordism, this volume exhibits all its pitfalls. Historical geology, biology, astronomy, and anthropology are all assumed to echo the scientific precision of Scripture. However, there is much

contrary evidence to a close harmony between Genesis and geology and it is improbable that astronomy or any other science can demonstrate a creation. The problems raised by evolution and anthropology are given a misleadingly facile treatment, often compounded with confusion. Half the book deals with the high statistical improbability of predictive accuracy in prophecy on other than revelatory grounds. Unfortunately, as this assumes prophecy it will be vitiated in the minds of the non-Christian by higher criticism. Indeed, the whole work falls with any fundamental impossibility of a natural theology or argument to inspiration from supposed agreement with science — a fact a mathematician like Stoner should have realized from the nature of logic. —*T.H.L.*

Victorious Christian Service, by Alan Redpath. Westwood, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell, 1958. 190 pp. $3.00.

An attempt at stating the basic principles of Christian service in any walk of life. The study is based upon the external and internal challenges to and responses of Nehemiah. The minister to the Moody Church gives us a thorough but easy-to-read companion to his *Victorious Christian Living* based on the book of Joshua. —*T.H.L.*

Babylon and the Old Testament, and *Samaria, the Capital of the Kingdom of Israel,* by Andre Parrot. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958 165 pp. and 143 pp. Illus. $2.75 each.

The series of studies in biblical archeology edited and primarily written by Andre Parrot seems to improve with each volume. The books on Babylon and Samaria are the seventh and eighth that have thus far appeared. They are authoritative, up to date, helpfully illustrated both with photographs and line drawings, and excellently written. In spite of voluminous details a strikingly clear picture emerges. One may not always agree with Dr. Parrot's interpretations or critical treatment of Scripture, but the student will unquestionably be better prepared to understand his Bible after studying these and the other books in this series. The professional archeologist will find them valuable and the simple student of the Word will find them fascinating. —*P.C.J.*

Archeology and the Pre-Christian Centuries, by J. A. Thompson. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1958. 139 pp. $1.50.

This is the third volume dealing with archeology in the Pathway series of contemporary evangelical studies. Prof. J. A. Thompson, a practicing archeologist, who wrote *Archeology and the Old Testament* for the series, now gives us a book about the almost silent centuries between the Testaments. An introduction and an incitement to a study of the period rather than a definitive work, the book nevertheless contains a remarkable amount

of detailed information. It deals with the exile and return of Israel as recorded in the archeology of Persia and Babylon, and takes us through the extra-Biblical period up to the days of Herod the Great. Interest is centered of course on the Jews and the preparation of the world for coming of Christ. There is an excellent chapter on Qumran and the Scrolls. —*P.C.J.*

The Epistle to the Romans, by Floyd E. Hamilton. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1958. 235 pp. $4.75.

Dr. Hamilton has written a simple, sober exposition of the epistle to the Romans. It deals thoroughly with the problems of interpretation and emphasizes the great doctrinal message of the epistle. The book is soundly evangelical, less profoundly theological than Hodge who is often referred to, but much more adequate than Newell. There is, however, an essential weakness: the author takes no cognizance of any scholarly work of the last half century. None of the new manuscript evidence is used, and the tensions of the contemporary theological scene are ignored. Moffatt, Dodd, Nygren, Barth may as well never have written, nor the Interpreters Bible been printed. This is a good, helpful commentary, but it is too bad that so often the work of evangelicals suffers because it is written for the world of the nineteenth century rather than the twentieth. —*P.C.J.*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

American Scientist in December has articles on Lamarck and Darwin in the history of science and on the naturalistic conception of life.

Anglican Theological Review, October. "The Early Church and the Ecumenical Problem" by Oscar Cullmann.

Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1957-58. Articles on free will and responsibility, on justifying moral principles, and on determinism and causal order.

Atlantic in November contains "The Evolution of Ethics" by Albert Schweitzer and in January has D. Bush, "Sex in the Modern Novel" and C. S. Lewis, "The Efficacy of Prayer."

Behavioral Science has an article on concepts of normal behavior in the October issue.

Bibliotheca Sacra has K. Kantzer continuing "Revelation and Inspiration in Neo-Orthodox Theology" in October.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October. Articles on the decision to use the A-bomb, 1944-5; the concept of reality in physics by Max Born; and two articles on population pressures. The entire November issue is on science and liberal education. In December Percy Bridgman discusses society and the individual.

Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society in the Spring has a series of papers on Christology in Ferré, Tillich, and Barth.

Centennial Review, Fall. M. Unamuno, "What is Truth?", R. Oppenheimer, "Analogy in Science", and O. Klapp, "Tragedy and the American Climate of Opinion."

Christian Century, November 19. Articles by W. F. Albright on the return to biblical theology and by P. Blanshard on the papal election and American law. On December 31 there is an article, "Church, State and the Will of God."

Christian Graduate, December. Articles on the Christian education of children.

Christian Scholar, September. Articles on the age of the universe, man's idea of nature, fideistic and scientific methods, and two articles on relating science and Christian belief.

Christianity Today. Berkouwer writes on revelation in the October 13 and 27 and November 10 issues and J. Packer continues on November 24 and December 8. In the last see also Clyde Kilby, "C. S. Lewis and His Critics."

Commentary in October has "Moses in the Thought of Freud" and D. Boorstin, "The Puritan Tradition." In November, J. Finkelstein compares the Hebrew and Babylonian Religious Spirit.

Current History, November. An issue on the changing American south. The December issue discusses a land we must watch — China.

Daedalus, Fall. A number of articles on evidence and inference in the physical and social sciences including history and law. Also a colloquy on the unity of learning by such as Tillich, Lewis Mumford, Jerome Bruner, Ernest Nagel, and Philipp Frank.

Diogenes, Fall. A. Gérard, "Romanticism and Stoicism in the American Novel."

Ecumenical Review, October. An article on population problems and family planning.

Eternity in December has C. E. Carlson, "Religion in Public Education" and in January has articles on conformity and on whether the Spirit is needed to understand Scripture.

Evangelical Quarterly, October-December. W. Stanford Reid, "A Reformed Approach to Christian Aesthetics."

Expository Times in October and November has J. McIntyre discussing whether the situation of science and religion has changed.

Fortune in October discusses the low productivity of the "education industry."

Frontier, October. Indian philosophy and Christian doctrine.

Harper's, November. T. B. Douglass discusses Protestant apathy to big city problems and Ian Stevenson discusses scientists with half-closed minds.

Harvard Theological Review has W. B. Piper, "Berkeley's Demonstration of God" in October.

Hibbert Journal, November. Articles by Bertrand Russell on his philosophical development and by others on the relevance of metaphysics; on language, logic, and faith; and on the historical Christian attitude to cremation.

His in November has a fine analysis of the relationship of the missionary to his parent organization.

Inquiry, Summer. C. D. Broad on philosophy and an article on the theoretical relationship of thought and action.

International Affairs in October discusses nuclear weapons and defense.

Interpretation in October has an analysis of Christian Science.

Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation, September. R. Heddendorf, "A Theoretical Consideration of the Function of Religion." Also letters on the origin of life.

Journal of Modern History, September. G. G. Iggers, "The Idea of Progress in Recent Philosophies of History."

Journal of Philosophy for October 23 has two papers on the present status of natural theology, for November 6 has three papers on the relation of science and the humanities in education, and for November 20 has an article in defense of moral absolutes.

Journal of Religious Thought, Spring-Summer. Articles on the theological rejection of natural theology, natural theology in John Calvin, Bultmann's theology, and the basis of Christian ethics.

Journal of Southern History, May. Articles on Bible publication and procurement in the Confederacy and on the New Deal.

London Quarterly and Holborn Review. The January issue is on the state of Old Testament studies today.

Modern Age, Fall. A symposium on integration in the south.

Nation for October 18 is a special issue on the F.B.I.

National Geographic for December has an illustrated article on the Dead Sea scrolls and the Qumran community.

National Review, November 8. Article on class struggle — American style. On December 20, M. Cronin writes "Humbug in Academic Freedom."

Natural History for November discusses the ancient history of the Indus valley area and for January discusses the history and importance of stone tools in anthropology.

Partisan Review, Summer. Ursula Brumm, "Symbolism and the Novel." In the Fall, H. Arendt writes, "The Crisis in Education."

Philosophical Review, January. J. Passmore, "History, the Individual, and Inevitability."

Philosophy in October has S. I. Benn, "An Approach to the Problems of Punishment." Compare with "Reward" in the December issue of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.*

Progressive Calvinism begins the new year as *First Principles* and specializes in personal and societal well-being. The price is four dollars (half price to students) and the address is 366 East 166th St., South Holland, Illinois.

Practical Anthropology, July-August. W. D. Reyburn discusses learning languages and also the relation of the missionary to the spread of culture. The September-December issue has an improved format and contains, as usual, fine articles on missionary anthropology — particularly one on the union of pagan and Catholic concepts in Mexican Indian culture.

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society for October has Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Scientific Study of Values and Contemporary Civilization" and H. Peyre, "Albert Camus, an Anti-Christian Moralist."

Quarterly Journal of Speech, October. T. R. Nilsen, "Free Speech, Persuasion, and the Democratic Process." F. S. Haiman writes "Democratic Ethics and the Hidden Persuaders" in December.

Reformed Journal for October has articles on Dooyeweerd's ideas of meaning and being and on Calvinists and their role in the Democratic Party (on this see the December issue).

Reformed Review for September has articles on the Christian and literature and on the Russian Orthodox church and its relations to Communism.

Religious Education, November-December. A symposium on the humanities and religious education.

Reporter for January 8 has a frightening article on the *growing* missile gap.

Review and Expositor, October. An article on Luther's discovery of justification by faith.

Saturday Review, November 8. J. T. Wilson, "A Visit to Red China's Hidden Capital of Science." Warren Weaver writes "A Scientist Ponders Faith" on January 3.

Science for November 21 has a letter on a new concept of ice-age history on p. 1290. There are two articles on science and general education on November 28.

Science Counselor, December. H. Miller, "Fossil Plants and Evolution."

Scientific American, January. Fay-Cooper Cole, "A Witness at the Scopes Trial."

Scottish Journal of Theology, December. Nels Ferré, "Natural Theology and the Christian Faith" and an analysis of Farrer's views of revelation.

Southwestern Journal of Theology. A new journal. The last issue deals largely with Mark's gospel, including source- and form-criticism.

Teachers College Record in November and December contain articles on progressive education and American progressivism.

Theology Today, October. Nels Ferré, "Contemporary Theology in the Light of 100 Years."

Thomist, October. D. R. Richardson, "The Philosophy of History and Historical Learning."

Times Science Review, Winter. M. Dixon, "Enzymes and Life."

U.S. News and World Report for October 24 has extensive exerpts from the controversial report of the Joint Commission on Alcoholism of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

Varsity Graduate of the U. of Toronto for December has articles on pressures on faculty time and correctives and on teaching civilized thinking in college.

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Heinz Politzer	*The Egghead Waits for Godot*
Jacques Ellul	*Concerning the Christian Attitude toward Law*
Henry G. Fairbanks	*Man's Separation from Nature*

Articles in recent issues

Donald H. Andrews	*The Challenge of the New Cosmology*
Michael B. Foster	*Man's Idea of Nature*
Carl Michalson	*The Crisis of Vocation*
Robert M. Brown	*The Reformed Tradition and Higher Education*
Tom Driver	*The Arts and the Christian Evangel*

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